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Abstract  
While socio-political instability and social change have marked effects on all members of 
society, youth appear to be particularly vulnerable to such instability. There is however, a 
dearth of research on how youth make sense of and orient themselves to such social change. 
Karl Mannheim (1936) argued that in times of social upheaval and instability individuals 
would engender “situationally transcendent ideas”, or ideologies, about the future of their 
society. In South Africa a tradition of research on future ideologies was begun in 1956 by 
Kurt Danziger (1963). Thereafter, Danziger‟s original research was replicated in three 
subsequent South African studies. These studies were conducted during, and shortly after, the 
era of apartheid, which was a context characterized by extreme socio-political instability. 
After the abolishment of apartheid, the South African socio-political landscape seemed to 
have finally reached a plateau of stability; however, the recent political events in which 
prominent ANC members publicly severed their alliances with the longstanding leading 
political party and formed a rival political party, threatened to reconfigure the South African 
political landscape directly before the upcoming 2009 elections. This political vicissitude 
prompted South African citizens to reflect carefully on the future of the country, and this thus 
signified the ideal time at which to conduct an additional study on South Africans future 
ideologies and in so doing, continue Kurt Danziger‟s line of research. The sample of the 
current study comprised 223 University of the Witwatersrand students. To garner their future 
ideologies participants were required to write brief essays on the history of South Africa 
projected into the future, as well as complete an optimism scale, a relative deprivation scale 
and a social group identification checklist. The essays were then analysed by means of 
quantitative thematic content analysis to identity the predominant future ideologies that are 
present amongst University of the Witwatersrand students. It emerged from the content of 
their essays that the sample most frequently foresaw futures of Liberalism, Deterioration and 
Catastrophe; however, these perceptions were not found to differ significantly in terms of 
race. An interesting finding was that a sizeable proportion of the sample used their essays as a 
way to vent about the current circumstances in the country and seemed to experience 
difficulty envisioning a possible future for the country. A generalized logistic regression 
revealed that optimism about the future and perceived relative deprivation are both significant 
predictors of whether one endorses Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future ideologies. 
The limitations of the current study and recommendations for future research are discussed.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Interest in future ideologies began with the work of Karl Mannheim (1936) who argued that 
in times of social upheaval and instability individuals would engender “situationally 
transcendent ideas”, or ideologies, about the future of their society (Finchilescu & Dawes, 
1999a, 2001). Socio-political instability and social change have marked effects on all 
members of society, but children and adolescents‟ are particularly vulnerable to this volatility 
(Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999a, 1999b, 2001). There is, however, a paucity of research on how 
adolescents‟ make sense of and orient themselves to social change. Kurt Danziger (1963), in 
1956, was the first to take an interest in identifying the range of future ideologies that existed 
amongst South African youths. Danziger‟s original study was then replicated by Du Preez, 
Bhana, Broekman, Louw and Nel in 1981, and thereafter, by Finchilescu and Dawes in 1992, 
and again in 1996. These studies were conducted during, and shortly after, the era of 
apartheid, which was a context characterized by extreme socio-political instability.  
 
1.1. The political context during the apartheid era 
 
Apartheid was a system of legal racial segregation that was enforced by the South African 
Nationalist Party government following their rise to power in 1948, and that was finally 
abolished in 1994. Under this oppressive administration the rights of the black African 
inhabitants of South Africa, who comprised the majority of the South African population, 
were severely restricted and minority rule by whites was maintained. Shortly after the 
Nationalist Party‟s election into power they began to actively establish the discriminatory 
structures that were at the core of the apartheid legislation. The year 1950 saw the passing of 
the Population Registration Act, which ensured that all South African citizens would be 
classified in accordance with the racial criteria that were imposed by the ruling party. The 
four main “races” that were identified and constructed by the apartheid system were black 
Africans, coloureds, Indians and whites. While the „white‟ racial classification was used to 
refer to all people of European descent, the „black African‟ racial category encompassed all 
individuals from the indigenous black population, the term „coloured‟ was used to refer to 
people of mixed descent, and the „Indian‟ race was comprised of all people who originated 
from the Indian subcontinent (Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999a). The Group Areas Act was 
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passed soon after. This policy categorically prevented the mixing of the South African race 
groups in most spheres of life. Thereafter several other legislations were passed that resulted 
in the complete disenfranchisement of all people of colour. Many anti-apartheid movements 
arose from this subjugation. However, the state strongly opposed these organisations efforts at 
liberation, and many political groups were banned and their leaders were arrested and tried in 
what was known as the Rivonia Trial of 1963-4. It was during this particular period of the 
1960s, one of the most politically repressive era‟s the country has ever known, that Kurt 
Danziger initiated research on future ideologies in South Africa. Following the Rivonia Trial 
the situation in South Africa began to alter drastically as black African youths began to rally 
for radical change from the 1970s onwards. This mobilization culminated in the well-known 
Soweto uprising of 1976. Thereafter, black African youth began to actively challenge and 
engage the state, and increasing military actions against the state signalled the end of the 
peaceful passive-resistance movements that anti-apartheid activists were initially so eager to 
abide by. In response to this widespread civil disobedience and rebellion several states of 
emergency were declared in the 1980s. It was during this new upsurge of anti-apartheid 
resistance that Du Preez et al. (1981) decided to continue Danziger‟s tradition of research and 
replicate his original study. When Nelson Mandela was finally released from prison in 1990, 
the country remained deeply torn and racially divided. He began negotiations with the state 
for the abolishment of the apartheid regime and levels of political violence peaked in the 
period of 1992 - May 1994. It was during this violent, yet hopeful interlude, that Finchilescu 
and Dawes conducted the first of their two studies. Finally, in 1994, the apartheid legislation 
was legitimately eradicated and the African National Congress (ANC) was voted into power 
in the country‟s first democratic elections and thus replaced the Nationalist Party as the 
country‟s new political dispensation. Nelson Mandela, the president of the ANC, immediately 
began efforts to de-racialise the South African population and create a sense of national unity 
that replaced the intense racial segregation that was characteristic of the former apartheid 
government. It was in this new era, two years after the downfall of apartheid that Finchilescu 
and Dawes conducted the second of their two studies on South African youth‟s future 
ideologies.  
 
1.2. The post-apartheid context and recent political events 
 
South Africa has undoubtedly come along way since the apartheid era. The ANC has 
maintained its majority rule over the past 15 years and has taken great lengths to repair the 
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divided country. It seemed as if a plateau of political stability had finally been reached. 
However, recent political events threatened to strike at the foundations of this stability. The 
radical shifts that have recently occurred in the governmental configuration, in which various 
government officials have joined opposing political parties, “marks a decisive moment in the 
history of post-apartheid South Africa” (Plaut, 2008) and has thus raised controversy amongst 
the nation‟s people. Two prominent ANC members, Mr. Mosiuoa Gerard Patrick Lekota, and 
Mr Sam Mbhazima Shilowa defected from the ANC and launched a rival political party 
known as COPE (Congress for the People) (South African Institute of Race Relations Fast 
Facts, January 2009). This is the first party to break away from the ANC since 1997 (South 
African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, March 2009), and this split therefore poses the 
first serious challenge to the ANC since it came to power 16 years ago (Plaut, 2008).  
 
Things came to a head in December of 2007 when the country‟s second democratic president, 
Thabo Mbeki, was unseated from his position as the leader of the ANC. Many South Africans 
however, objected to the manner in which Mbeki was forced to resign just months before the 
end of his term. Lekota, out of loyalty to Mbeki, was one of several cabinet ministers to resign 
from the ANC following Mbeki‟s forced resignation. Lekota openly accused the ANC of 
betraying its democratic principles and threatened to form a breakaway party that could 
challenge the ANC in the upcoming 2009 elections (Bearak, 2008). This threat culminated in 
the immediate suspension of Lekota and his former deputy Mluleki George. Other provincial 
leaders who were found to be organising meetings for Lekota were also suspended for 
"undermining and betraying the organisation." Lekota resigned his position as South African 
defence minister and shortly thereafter formed the rival political party COPE (News iafrica, 
2008). This split from the ANC, it was said, “could reconfigure the South African political 
landscape before elections next year [2009]” (Bearak, 2008). This political instability coupled 
with the arguably tenuous state of the country at present has, in the light of the country‟s 
fourth democratic elections, surely triggered insecurities amongst the South African 
population and prompted citizens to reflect carefully on the future of the country. This 
produced a feeling amongst South Africans that the upcoming election might lead to change 
in the country‟s political structure, and after 16 years of ANC governance, Plaut (2008) says, 
“there is now a real wind of change in the air”.  
 
The current researcher was interested to discover whether the feelings of South African 
citizens towards the current political volatility and the arguably precarious state of the nation 
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at present were strong enough to elicit such “situationally transcendent ideas” or future 
ideologies, as Mannheim (1936) proposes. The opportunity for continuing Kurt Danziger‟s 
tradition of research thus arose.  
 
1.3. The aims of the current study 
 
The primary aim of the present study was to discover the predominant future ideologies that 
exist amongst students at the University of the Witwatersrand in the current social, economic 
and political South African context, and in so doing, continue a tradition of research on South 
Africans future ideologies that was begun by Kurt Danziger in 1956. In a racially stratified 
society, such as South Africa, the ideological responses of adolescents are unlikely to be 
homogenous (Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999b). In the past, the ways in which the former 
apartheid administration impacted uniquely on the various South African race groups would 
most certainly have played a determining role in the emergence of these ideologies per race 
group. Similarly, in today‟s society, the ubiquitous after-effects of this oppressive 
dispensation still means that each of the country‟s race groups is disproportionately affected, 
and as a result, this homogeneity of future ideologies should indeed remain widespread across 
the South African population groups. In accordance with the above, the researcher therefore 
wished to determine whether the predominant future ideologies that emerged from this 
study‟s sample bore any association with race, as well as the participants‟ primary social 
group identifications. It was further envisaged that one‟s level of optimism towards the future 
and the discontent that arises from one‟s experience of relative deprivation would affect the 
way in which one perceives the future and influence the future ideology that one constructs. 
As a result, the researcher set out to ascertain how optimistic the University‟s students are to 
the future of South Africa, as well as to discover what their experiences of relative deprivation 
are in this context. Thereafter, it was determined whether optimism to the future and 
perceived relative deprivation influenced the samples construction of future ideologies.  
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
2.1.  Future orientation or ideology 
 
 2.1.1. A conceptual understanding 
  
An ideology is a set of beliefs or a way of understanding the world and every human being 
has his own ideology or ideologies that constitute his symbolic universe of which priority is 
usually given to one belief (Degenaar, 1983; Leatt, Kneifel & Nurnberger, 1986). It follows 
that a future ideology is therefore a set of beliefs concerning the future. Varying definitions of 
the concept of future orientation/ideology exist. While Nurmi (1991, 1993, as cited in 
Adamson, Ferrer-Wreder & Kerpelman, 2007, p.95) describes it as being the “extent to which 
people can imagine their futures in terms of goals, hopes, expectations and plans”, Grootboom 
(2007) considers it to be one‟s preferred mode of thought and behaviour, or where one wants 
to go and how one ought to arrive there. Seginer (2009) defines it as being an individual‟s 
tendency to engage in future thinking, while another one of her articles speaks of future 
orientation as being a “psychological future” (Seginer, 2008, p.272).   
 
2.1.2. Pioneering work on future ideologies 
 
Karl Mannheim (1936) was the first to assess the future ideologies of a society during times 
of socio-political instability. Mannheim argued that in such times individuals would generate 
situationally transcendent ideas about the future of their society. In a stable society, he said, 
there is no desire or need for change, because the ways of thinking of all members of a society 
converge and result in a singular, unified worldview. However, in a society where social and 
political instability are ubiquitous, where the values of different groups within this society 
differ greatly from one another, and where members of this society are dissatisfied with the 
existing order, the unified worldview of that society will disintegrate. Mannheim goes on to 
say that it is only in “a world of upheaval in which new values are being created and old ones 
destroyed” that individuals will attempt to “annihilate specific beliefs and attitudes as well as 
the intellectual foundations upon which they rest” (p.57), as it is only in rapidly and 
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profoundly changing societies that ideas/values that were once regarded as fixed and stable 
can be subjected to such systematic criticism. Therefore, when a social situation changes its 
system of norms, disharmony arises between the situation and its old norms. As a result, 
individuals or groups will develop ideas about the future of their society that transcend the 
immediate situation. Mannheim explains that this is because “when the imagination finds no 
satisfaction in existing reality, it seeks refuge in wishfully constructed places and periods” 
(p.184). These ideologies therefore serve to offer these individuals a much-desired change in 
their erratic society through a normative thought process. They thus become motivated to 
impose this particular ideology on their society both cognitively, and in action. Mannheim 
(1936) also put forward that during times of social instability the specific future ideologies 
that one constructs will be based on one‟s particular relationship to the current social crisis. 
One‟s future ideology will thus correspond with the particular position that one‟s group 
occupies in their struggle for power (Mannheim, 1952).  
 
2.2. Future orientation during adolescent development  
 
Rapid social change inevitably has significant consequences for and psychological impacts on 
all members of a society, irrespective of whether this experience is viewed in a positive or 
negative light (Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999a). Children and youth however, seem to be 
particularly vulnerable to such situations, as they are affected in very specific ways. For 
example, Dawes (1994, as cited in Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999a) outlines how youths are 
most likely to be drawn into violent conflict either as members of the armed forces, or as 
participants in revolutionary political movements. While considerable attention has been 
directed at the effect of adversity on youth in South Africa, far less research has focused on 
how adolescents and young adults make sense of and orient themselves to socio-political 
change. Furthermore, only a few studies have concentrated on future ideologies as an 
important means of examining socio-political perspectives (Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999b).  
 
Adolescence is a period during which future thinking becomes of vital importance. The term 
„adolescence‟ is a derivation of a Greek term that essentially means “to grow” or “to grow to 
maturity” (Hurlock, 1980 as cited in Grootboom, 2007). As such, this important phase of the 
life-span coheres around development and is directed towards a position or stage in the future. 
Incidentally, development, Grootboom (2007) puts forth, means „moving forward‟ from a 
position in the present to a position in the future, and it is therefore necessary for the 
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adolescent individual to begin making crucial decisions about his/her future during this 
developmental period. Adamson, Ferrer-Wreder and Kerpelman (2007) echo the 
abovementioned point. They confirm that “dreaming and reflecting upon one‟s personal 
future have been found to be a salient issue for many young people” (p.95). They go on to say 
that the visions youths have for themselves in the future have implications for young adult 
development, as these beliefs modify the manner in which adolescents cope with 
developmental tasks and transitions (Adamson et al., 2007).  
 
Nurmi (1991, as cited in Townsend, 2002) lists four fundamental reasons for why he believes 
that thinking and planning for the future are particularly important for youth. Adolescents, he 
says, face a multiplicity of normative tasks that are set for them by their significant others 
(parents, peers, teachers), and many of these tasks involve some form of orientation to the 
future, as they most often concern life-span developmental tasks that require one to think 
about and plan for the future. Secondly, he argues that much of adolescents thinking about the 
future will crucially affect their later adult lives, especially as it applies to career, lifestyle and 
future familial choices. His third justification is that the manner in which adolescents perceive 
their futures plays a fundamental role in the formation of their identity. Finally, he reports that 
an association has been found to exist between adolescents‟ future outlooks and various 
problem behaviours. Several other studies confirm this. Robbins and Bryan‟s (2004) study on 
the relationship between future orientations, impulsive sensation seeking and risk behaviour 
among adjudicated adolescents uncovered evidence that small, but reliable relationships do 
indeed exist between future orientation and risk behaviours. Conversely, in their 9-month 
prospective study of the predictors of future expectations of inner-city children, Dubow, 
Arnett, Smith and Ippolito‟s (2001) findings revealed that high positive expectations to the 
future are related to low levels of problem behaviour, negative peer influences, high school 
involvement, internal resources (e.g. self-esteem, self-competence, etc) and social support. A 
possible explanation for these relationships is that experiencing confusion about who one is at 
the present moment and perceiving negative visions of the future may in fact contribute to a 
self-fulfilling prophecy in which adolescents make life choices that are in line with these 
pictures of themselves (Adamson et al., 2007).  
 
An increasing distinction is being drawn between one‟s personal and private future 
orientations, and one‟s public or societal future orientations. The literature predominantly 
emphasises the former mode of future thinking (Poole & Cooney, 1987). This more 
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personalized future orientation resembles an autobiography, as it tells a personal subjective 
life story that consists of those life domains that the individual deems are important and that 
give meaning to one‟s life. This personal „model of the future‟ provides the foundation for the 
setting of goals, planning, exploring options and making commitments that guide one‟s 
behaviour and developmental course (Seginer, 2008). In contrast, the public/societal future 
orientation has been found to centre upon three specific domains, which include (1) major 
environmental problems (e.g. nuclear threat, resource depletion), (2) the future of the world in 
general (e.g. stability, change), and (3) the future of key social dimensions and institutions 
(e.g. peace, politics, development, education) (Poole & Cooney, 1987).  
 
2.3. Previous research on future orientation 
 
Only a handful of studies have concentrated on these latter less common societal/public future 
ideologies or orientations. They include research that was initiated in South Africa in 1956 by 
Kurt Danziger. Danziger‟s original study was then replicated in three subsequent studies. 
These four studies shall be discussed in the ensuing section. Hereafter, other international 
studies that have focused on perceptions of the future shall be considered.  
 
2.3.1. Previous research on future ideologies conducted in the South African context  
 
  2.3.1.1. Kurt Danziger‟s 1956 study 
 
In Danziger‟s research he collected essays written about the future of South Africa by high-
school and university students from the black African, Indian, white-Afrikaans speaking and 
white-English speaking South African population groups between 1956 and 1962. 
Participants were told to write this essay as if they were historians in 2010 writing about the 
history of South Africa from the period 1960 to 2010. Danziger categorised a total of 439 
essays as reflecting one of five dominant future ideologies: Conservative, Liberal, Technicist, 
Catastrophic and Revolutionary. His definition of the Conservative ideology took the past to 
serve as a model for the present and the future. The future thus consisted of the carrying out 
of traditionalist policies. At the core of the Technicist ideology was the notion that the present 
leads to the future not by means of social change, but rather by means of technological 
advancement. In a Catastrophic future ideology there is fatalistic acceptance of social violence 
and destruction. As a result, the present situation deteriorates to the point where catastrophe is 
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finally reached. In stark contrast, a Liberal ideology involves the gradual but continuous 
improvement of the existing order by means of peaceful reforms that are instituted by the 
government, while in a Revolutionary ideology complete change of the existing social order is 
desired; however, those who uphold this ideology believe that this change can only be 
brought about by violent means. Those essays which did not represent a definable future were 
categorised as Unclassifiable.  
 
Danziger‟s findings revealed that the white Afrikaans-speaking group upheld mainly 
Technicist and Conservative ideologies, while the white English-speaking respondents were 
predominantly Catastrophic and Conservative. The Indian/Asian sample was strongly Liberal 
in their outlooks to the future, followed by Revolutionary; while the ideologies of the black 
African group were the opposite. They upheld Revolutionary ideologies most strongly 
followed by Liberal outlooks.  
 
2.3.1.2. Du Preez, Bhana, Broekman, Louw and Nel‟s 1981 study 
 
Danziger‟s original study was then replicated by Du Preez, Bhana, Broekman, Louw and Nel 
in 1981. Their study‟s sample consisted of psychology university students from five South 
African universities. Participants were requested to write an essay that was titled identically to 
Danziger‟s original essay topic, with the appropriate modification of dates. Comparisons were 
once again made between the black African, Indian, white Afrikaans-speaking and white-
English speaking population groups; however, participants from the coloured race group were 
included in this replication. The authors analyzed 1387 essays in accordance with Danziger‟s 
original ideology classification system.  
 
Du Preez et al. (1981) found that significantly lower proportions of the white Afrikaans-
speaking group, as reflected by their samples findings, now upheld Technicist and 
Conservative ideologies. Instead, they had become predominantly Liberal and Catastrophic in 
their orientations to the future. The Catastrophic ideology had become even stronger amongst 
the white English-speaking group, while the Conservative ideology appeared less frequently. 
This group now upheld predominantly Catastrophic ideologies followed by Revolutionary 
ideologies. While the Indian/Asian group foresaw a predominantly Liberal future in 1963 
followed by a Revolutionary future, in 1981 this order was found to have reversed. This group 
had become strongly Revolutionary and far less Liberal. Amongst the black African sample, 
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more Liberals emerged during the 1981 study putting this ideology as this groups most widely 
held future outlook. They had become less Revolutionary over the period from 1963 to 1981. 
The coloured sample that was included in this replication was found to be staunchly 
Revolutionary in their future perceptions.   
 
2.3.1.3. Finchilescu and Dawes 1992 and 1996 studies 
 
Thereafter, Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a, 1999b, 2001) conducted their own replication of 
the study in 1992 and again in 1996. Fourteen- and seventeen-year old high school students, 
from various schools in the Western Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal provinces, were asked to write 
a simplified version of Danziger‟s original essay topic titled “My thoughts and feelings about 
the future of South Africa over the next 10 years”. A total of 1516 essays were analyzed and 
categorised according to Danziger‟s original classification system. However, two additional 
ideology categories were added in 1996, namely the Socialist and the Social 
Democratic/Redress ideologies. While this former ideology is communist in content and 
depicts a future in which land and resources are redistributed amongst the population and 
poverty is eradicated as a result, the latter ideology represents a future in which the 
government attempts to eradicate poverty by implementing interventions that serve to 
promote groups that were formerly disadvantaged. Policies of redress (affirmative action, 
housing development, etc) are at the core of this future. While the Socialist ideology was in 
fact referred to by Mannheim (1936), it was not used by Danziger in his original study. 
Following on Du Preez et al.‟s (1981) previous study, Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a) 
considered the same five South African population groups that these authors included in their 
replication.  
 
In 1992 the white Afrikaans-speaking group and the white English-speaking group were 
found to be predominantly Catastrophic and Liberal in their outlooks to the future. In 1996 
this had not changed. However, both the coloured and Indian/Asian groups had been mainly 
Liberal in 1992 followed by Catastrophic. In 1996 this order reversed for both groups. The 
black African group remained predominantly Liberal from 1992 to 1996 (Finchilescu & 
Dawes, 1999a, 1999b, 2001). 
 
No studies on future ideologies have been conducted in South Africa since Finchilescu and 
Dawes most recent study.  
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2.3.1.4. The Dinokeng Scenarios  
In 2009 however, a scenario team that called themselves the Dinokeng Scenarios was forged 
in an attempt “To create a space and language for open, reflective and reasoned strategic 
conversation among South Africans, about possible futures for the country, and the 
opportunities, risks and choices these futures present” (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). In 1994, 
the birth of democracy in South Africa created a vision of unity and nationhood for all and 
elevated the citizens‟ hope for improvements in the quality of life in South Africa. This task 
team acknowledges however, that “the realities of constructing a new nation have revealed 
themselves as an entirely grittier and more complex task than we had anticipated. Our legacy 
challenges us once more with the task of reconstruction. We have not yet vanquished our past; 
nor have we yet fully constructed our future” (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). In response to the 
critical challenges currently facing the country, a group of 35 South Africans came together to 
openly discuss the current political, social and economic realities facing South Africa. These 
35 individuals comprise leaders from civil society and government, political parties, business, 
public administration, trade unions, religious groups, academia and the media, and are thus 
representative of a wide range of South African society. Drawing upon the experience and 
expertise of each of these 35 individuals, as well as the input from experts in various other 
fields, the Scenario Team considered and discussed the country‟s accomplishments and 
failures since 1994, as well as the critical challenges that lie ahead. From this discussion they 
developed various scenario stories on possible futures for South Africa, and these scenarios 
were found to point to three possible futures for the country. The Scenario Team called these 
three futures “Walk Together”, “Walk Behind” and “Walk Apart”. The Team intended these 
stories to stimulate action-oriented discussions amongst the country‟s people as to their 
options and choices. In order to achieve this, the Scenario Team launched a media and 
engagement campaign in an attempt to extend the reach of the scenarios to the citizens of 
South Africa.  
The three hypothetical future scenarios that emerged from the discussions that took place in 
the Dinokeng Scenarios undertaking shall be discussed below.  
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The „Walk Together‟ future scenario 
 
In the „Walk Together‟ future it is by the efforts of South African citizens that the country is 
able to progress and prosper. This scenario is divided into four main stages: (1) 2009 to 2011 
are described as the „Bleak Years‟. They begin with the current ruling party retaining its 
majority. Hereafter, the global economic crisis results in declining investment, growth and tax 
revenues. Service delivery deteriorates even further and as a result, various citizen groups 
become active in areas such as health, education and crime. (2) In 2012 to 2014 the citizens of 
South Africa are no longer content to simply sit back and accept the unacceptable conditions 
in the country. They begin demanding more and citizen associations begin to spread 
throughout the country. The government finally promises to take action against the 
incompetence that is so rife amongst managers and civil servants, and this becomes their 
election manifesto. Improvements in service delivery are noticed. (3) During 2015 to 2017 the 
government begins to realise that they cannot maintain the current levels of service delivery 
and infrastructure alone. They advocate a national social pact in an attempt to address the 
deep structural challenges facing the country, and a „Citizens Charter‟ is born as a result. 
South African businesses assume greater responsibility in education, infrastructure and health, 
while trade unions work actively to combat unemployment, and citizens‟ work with the 
government to monitor education, health and crime. (4) 2018 to 2020 are the years during 
which true progress is evident in the country. Investment increases and employment rises; the 
citizens call for greater accountability from politicians and as a result, the voting system is 
officially changed so that politicians are required to be directly accountable to the voters.  
 
The „Walk Behind‟ future scenario 
 
The „Walk Behind‟ future scenario depicts a considerably less promising future than that of 
the former scenario; however, it is less futile than the scenario to follow. This scenario story 
can also be divided into four main stages: (1) During the years of 2009 to 2011 the ruling 
party, who has managed to retain their power, increase their efforts at developing the country. 
They invest considerably in large infrastructure projects and implement programmes to create 
more unskilled jobs. (2) However, from 2012 to 2014 due to the continuing global crisis 
unemployment increases and the government is forced to spend more on social grants. This 
results in a significant increase in the budget deficit and the country is forced to borrow. (3) 
2015 to 2017 sees the government once again investing in large-scale infrastructure 
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programmes to boost development. Skills development is also promoted. (4) Finally, from 
2018 to 2020 investment declines considerably, the economy stagnates, and unemployment 
begins to worsen even further. The government is forced to once again borrow more money 
on the international markets at high interest rates. Widespread discontent starts to become 
evident and civil unrest flares up. The government attempts to suppress these protests before 
they spread.  
 
The „Walk Apart‟ future scenario 
 
The „Walk Apart‟ future scenario depicts a future of severe and rapid deterioration that 
eventually culminates in a state of emergency. The four main stages of this scenario are as 
follows: (1) In 2009 to 2011 the global crisis puts the economy under strain as investment, 
growth and tax revenues decline. Unemployment rises and crime becomes more rampant. (2) 
2012 to 2014 sees widespread deterioration in the country as corruption in the government 
intensifies, the education and healthcare sectors deteriorate, unemployment worsens even 
further, and poverty escalates. Many leave the country. (3) From 2015 to 2017 the „shadows 
lengthen‟. Crime increases and the criminal justice system becomes increasingly inefficient, 
investment continues to decline, unemployment rises and service delivery fails. (4) 
Catastrophe begins to emerge during the years 2018 to 2020, as the budget deficit escalates 
and service delivery worsens even further. The government begins to clamp down on the 
media and suppress civil protests. They form a clandestine alliance with local warlords and 
militia and a reign of terror and fear is unleashed. South African citizens are threatened with 
violence and the withdrawal of services if they do not vote for the ruling party. Unbridled 
resistance and repression arise and a state of emergency is finally declared.  
 
2.3.1.5. Previous research on future ideologies conducted internationally  
 
Various studies on future perceptions have been conducted in other countries as well - some 
of which were carried out during earlier years and some of which were conducted more 
recently. Selected studies shall be discussed in the section to follow.  
 
One such study, conducted by Kats (1982), attempted to tap into the patterning of Israeli 
citizens‟ future concerns over time using data that was collected from two surveys that were 
conducted in 1962 and 1975 respectively. Both studies made use of open-ended questions in 
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which respondents were required to describe their own personal futures or the future of their 
country in positive and/or negative terms. Definite shifts in the concerns of Israelis from 1962 
to 1975 were noticed; however, as the current study is interested in societal future perceptions 
rather than personal future perceptions, only the findings of Israelis societal future perceptions 
will be discussed. It was found that in the 1962 survey the hopes of the Israeli respondents 
cohered round two predominant areas: economic matters; and social, cultural and political 
concerns. In 1975 a predominant hope was for peace, which was found to intersect with hopes 
for economic stability, and an improved standard of living. Social, cultural and political issues 
remained an area of national hope for Israelis, while hope for the continuation of peace 
emerged as a third area. In terms of Israelis national fears, the fear of war became a more 
prominent issue over the 1962-1975 period. Fears of political and economic instability were 
rife amongst Israelis in 1962 and this continued to remain a concern in 1975. However, 
various concerns about nationhood also emerged as an area of fear during this later survey.  
 
A further study that was conducted by Poole and Cooney (1987) examined the personal and 
societal future orientations of 15-year old individuals in two contrasting cultures: Singapore 
and Sydney, Australia. These authors found that major environmental concerns, such as war 
and destruction, featured prominently in their respondents‟ perceptions of the future. 
Furthermore, it was found that the adolescents listed the majority of future events under 
political. This was considered to be a surprising finding, as prior studies have found that 
adolescents have a tendency to be disengaged from politics. While Singapore adolescents saw 
the future mainly in relation to their own country, the opposite was true for Australian 
adolescents who appeared to have a broader perspective on society. Furthermore, while the 
samples personal futures were seen in pleasant terms, their societal future perceptions were 
more pessimistic and uncertain. Poole and Cooney (1987) propose that adolescents may in 
fact be choosing to keep these personal and societal aspects separate from one another in 
order to exercise some control over their lives, or as a way to shield themselves from the 
anxiety about the future.  
 
An article written by Ono (2005) cites various other studies that have been conducted on 
future perceptions; however, the exact nature and contexts of these studies are absent and only 
the basic findings are reported. Studies conducted in Australia reflect that youths feel 
powerless about future happenings, and that they are concerned for the mounting uncertainty 
that advancements in technology will bring about (Eckersley, 1997 as cited in Ono, 2005). It 
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emerged in another study (Holden, 2002 as cited in Ono, 2005) that as children grow older 
they tend to become less optimistic about their futures, while a study conducted in Finland 
(Rubin, 1998 as cited in Ono, 2005) revealed that Finnish youths images of society and the 
world are rather vague and seem to be influenced by the information that they derive from the 
mass media. Ono (2005) also refers to a number of surveys that were carried out in Japan by 
the Japan Youth Research Institute that focused on Japanese youths images of the future. The 
first survey that is mentioned asked high school students to disclose their perceptions about 
Japanese society in the 21
st
 century. It emerged from the participants‟ responses that there was 
an ardent desire for greater equality to be brought about between men and women, and for 
better living conditions in various suburbs. Other hopes cohered around technological 
advancements improving life satisfaction, a more hopeful and freer society, a more peaceful 
world, better living standards, greater trust amongst people, diminished economic inequality, 
less injustice and corruption, and reduced crime rates. The second survey which also made 
use of Japanese high school students uncovered that only 34% of the respondents possessed 
an optimistic view of the future, while 64% were conversely negative in their perceptions of 
the future. It is Ono‟s (2005) argument that the after-effects of World War II on Japanese 
society have resulted in Japanese citizens becoming detached from their local contexts, 
resulting in a move towards independent living and subsequent breakdown of social cohesion 
and integration. This has served to weaken Japanese youth‟s interest in society and an 
indifference to societal occurrences has arisen.  
 
A more recent study conducted by Gudrun and Mathias (2008) wished to ascertain the 
possible shifts in attitudes of German youths towards European integration. This study was 
primarily based on the results of the 2006 Shell Youth Survey, which is a research endeavour 
that examines the living situation of 12- to 25-year-olds in Germany every four years. While 
the focus of Gudrun and Mathias‟ (2008) study was not entirely on future perceptions, this did 
nonetheless form a minor part of their research. They were interested in discovering what 
proportion of German youths supported the idea that the European Union should develop into 
a single state in the future. While 49% of their respondents supported this integration in 2002, 
in 2006 these attitudes were found to have altered dramatically, as only 32% remained in 
favour of this integration.  
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2.4.  The current South African context 
 
While the violent political upheaval and instability that were so characteristic of the past no 
longer permeate today‟s society, many would still argue that a great deal of instability and 
insecurity still exists. While South Africa has accomplished a great deal over the past few 
years, the country is still faced with numerous challenges that severely threaten the quality of 
life of its citizens: unemployment, crime, HIV/AIDS, public services, housing, education, 
health care, poverty, and corruption (Orkin & Jowell, 2006). Such stressful societal events 
unavoidably influence one‟s perceptions of the future (Grootboom, 2007), and it is thus 
important to consider the present circumstances in the country, both positive and negative, as 
they will certainly have influenced the participants‟ construction of future ideologies in the 
current study. Some of the abovementioned domains will be now be discussed in an effort to 
paint as clear and comprehensive a picture of the situation in the current South African 
context.  
 
2.4.1. Population growth and the provision of basic services 
The South African population is expanding rapidly. In 1996 it averaged 40.6 million. In the 
eleven year period from 1996 to 2007 this figure grew by 19.5% and the population now 
averages approximately 48.5 million individuals. As a result, the number of South African 
households subsequently increased by an astonishing 51.1% during this same period. In light 
of this, it becomes evident why the governments task to provide basic services to South 
African households has become increasingly difficult. However, despite this challenge, the 
provision of basic services such as electricity and access to piped water was noted to have 
undergone improvement in all the South African provinces (South African Institute of Race 
Relations Fast Facts, January 2008).  
 
2.4.2. Unemployment and poverty 
 
Unemployment in South Africa remains unacceptably high, and as a result, many families live 
in extreme poverty. The statistics reflect that nearly a quarter of the working-age population is 
unable to find employment (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). The government has of late enhanced 
their efforts to address and ultimately eradicate poverty. A particularly momentous 
intervention saw the introduction of social grants which are now being delivered to 
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approximately 13 million individuals. However, despite these serious efforts about 40% of 
South African households still live below the poverty line (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). As a 
result, hunger and malnutrition are worsening (Roberts, 2006).  
 
2.4.3. Crime 
 
Crime and violence are particularly pervasive problems in South Africa, and all South African 
communities and sectors of society are threatened by it. When certain crime statistics are 
considered however, it appears as if there is cause for hope. In the past five years there seems 
to have been a decrease in the incidence of violent contact crimes (Dinokeng Scenarios, 
2009). Nevertheless, the struggle to combat crime in the country still seems to be far from 
over. Mϕller (2007) also agrees that while crime has indeed decreased, it still remains 
incredibly high when compared to international countries.  
 
While there have been considerable recent efforts by the government to combat organised 
crime, South African citizens still face a police force that has been described as “under-
resourced, under-trained, ill-equipped and demoralised” (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). It is 
therefore not surprising that in 2007 a staggering 40 billion rand was spent on private security. 
This figure speaks to the limited faith that ordinary South African citizens have in the South 
African Police Service (SAPS). The numbers of private security officers in the country far 
outweigh those of active police personnel (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009; South African Institute 
of Race Relations Fast Facts, October 2008). South Africans residing in poorer communities 
who are unable to afford private security have given up hope that the police will protect them, 
and have resorted to vigilantism (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, the country‟s failure to control crime and ensure the safety of its citizens has a 
negative impact on South Africa‟s appeal as a tourist destination and as an investment 
opportunity (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).  
 
2.4.4. Health and Welfare 
 
South Africa has the fourth highest rate of HIV/Aids infection in the world (Dinokeng 
Scenarios, 2009). The pandemic has had truly devastating effects on the country. The disease 
has affected teachers, nurses, parents and young workers whose deaths have left their families 
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impoverished. Surviving grandparents are often left to care for their orphaned grandchildren 
on their inadequate pensions and social grants. In 2007, approximately 1.4 million children 
were left orphaned by the virus, and 11.6% of the South African population was estimated to 
be infected with the disease in 2008. By 2007 the disease was already responsible for causing 
the deaths of 2.16 million individuals, which accounted for 48% of all deaths in South Africa 
in 2007. As a result, the country‟s healthcare sector is under severe and mounting pressure 
(South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, October 2008). Furthermore, the former 
government‟s belated response to the HIV/Aids pandemic saw the delayed provision of Anti-
retroviral drugs (ARVs) and of testing and counselling sites (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).  
 
2.4.5. Education 
 
The country‟s faltering education system is a serious cause for concern. South Africa ranks 
among the lowest in the world on basic literacy and numeracy skills. Furthermore, many 
teachers are under-qualified, demoralised and lack the commitment and professionalism 
necessary for their professions (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).  
 
Black South Africans appear to be the worst affected by the poor quality of the education 
system, and statistics seem to reflect that the failures in public education are now the most 
significant factor retarding the social and economic progress of black South Africans (South 
African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, December 2009). This “rotten public 
education”, as some describe it as being (John Kane-Berman, South African Institute of Race 
Relations Fast Facts, December 2009), spells serious consequences for the future of the 
country, as the quality of public schooling is so poor in some areas that it is denying black 
African learners‟ any opportunities to improve their social and economic standings. 
Furthermore, if the quality of education does not undergo dramatic improvement social and 
economic inequalities between race groups will be maintained for decades to come (South 
African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, December 2009). 
 
On a more positive note, the government‟s introduction of compulsory education has served 
to drastically increase school enrolment over the past 15 years; education has been integrated 
unlike in the past; there have been significant further budget allocations to higher education 
and the school nutrition scheme; and the proportion of black African students attending 
universities has increased (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).  
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2.4.6. Xenophobia 
 
South Africa has also been severely impacted by the instability of its failed neighbouring 
country, Zimbabwe. Due to the dire conditions in Zimbabwe its citizens are migrating to 
South Africa in their masses and as a result, South Africa is being forced to bear this 
country‟s social, economic and political burdens which inevitably put South Africa under 
increasing strain. This large-scale influx of Zimbabwean citizens creates fierce competition 
between these foreigners and local South Africans for scare resources, such as employment 
and housing, etc (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009). Consequently, upsurges of sporadic violence 
broke out between these rival groups. The wave of xenophobic attacks that began on the 11
th
 
of May 2008 in Alexandria, an overcrowded slum located next to the affluent suburb of 
Sandton in Johannesburg, shocked South Africans and made headlines around the world 
(Kapp, 2008). Xenophobic violence included gunshot and stabbing wounds, broken limbs and 
burns. At least 62 individuals lost their lives, 670 were seriously injured and more than 1300 
arrested (Kapp, 2008). As a result of these horrific incidents, scores of foreigners, many of 
whom had fled from their countries of origin to seek refuge in South Africa, were forced to 
return to their home lands, while thousands of others took up residence in churches, mosques, 
community centres, police stations and plots of land on the side of highways. It was estimated 
that 170 000 foreigners were displaced due to these events (South African Institute of Race 
Relations Fast Facts, August 2008).  
 
2.4.7. Failures and corruption in government 
 
Weak leadership is evident in all sectors of South African society (Dinokeng Scenarios, 
2009). Since 1994 the media has reported numerous stories concerning the inefficacy of the 
South African government. This coverage has featured tales of corruption, incompetence, and 
failures of and delays in delivery (Daniel, Southall & Dippenaar, 2006). Government leaders 
lack many vital skills that are necessary to occupy government positions and many of them 
display a lack of commitment to serving the public. It can be argued that these deficits are 
responsible for creating the “culture of mediocrity, incompetence, fraud, corruption, nepotism 
and entitlement” that is so evident in the South African government (Dinokeng Scenarios, 
2009). The recent allegations of corruption that were directed at the leader of the African 
National Congress (ANC), Jacob Zuma, brought matters of corruption to the fore and sparked 
acute disapproval amongst the country‟s citizens.  
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2.4.8. Race relations 
 
South Africa‟s history has essentially revolved around race and „colour‟. Race relations were, 
and still are, ingrained in the fabric of South African society and in the minds of South 
African citizens. Apartheid has been described as the „standard of racism around the world‟ 
until it was dismantled in 1994 (Jones, 2006). However, after Nelson Mandela‟s release from 
prison and his election as president of the country, he focused his efforts at reconciling the 
deeply divided country and creating a multiracial nation. The symbol of the rainbow was 
adopted to represent the strongly collectivist and inclusive nation that would hopefully come 
to define South Africa (Dickow & Mϕller, 2002). There is no doubt that South Africa has 
indeed come a long way in terms of race relations. Common concerns are beginning to 
emerge across racial barriers. These include shared concerns about crime, the lack of 
government leadership, and problems of poor service delivery (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009).  
 
In recent years South Africa introduced two primary affirmative action laws: Affirmative 
Action (AA) and Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) (South African Institute 
of Race Relations Fast Facts, December 2009), in an attempt to reduce the inequality that still 
exists between the South African race groups. While these laws were created with the best 
intentions, some would nonetheless argue that they served to make South Africa more race-
conscious (Dickow & Mϕller, 2002). Furthermore, instead of empowering citizens of 
„colour‟ some contend that these laws have the opposite effect, and that they have led to a 
“culture of seeping entitlement” (Vusi Mavimbela – director general of the presidents office, 
South African Institute of Race Relations Fast Facts, December 2009), which ultimately 
implies victimhood. 
 
2.5.  Potential determinants of future ideologies  
 
It was envisaged that three additional variables – optimism about the future, perceived relative 
deprivation and primary social group identification – would be important determinants in the 
construction of one‟s future ideology in the current study. While one‟s levels of optimism 
about the future and the specific future ideology that one endorses cannot be regarded as 
being completely analogous constructs, they share in common the fact that they are both 
perceptions of the future. The outlook that one has to the future, in terms of their optimism 
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about what is to come, is thus highly likely to influence the future ideology that one 
constructs.  
 
It was mentioned above that the specific future ideology that one constructs will be based on 
one‟s relationship to the current social situation (Mannheim, 1936). This implies that future 
ideologies are to some extent extensions of the present, as they are determined partly by one‟s 
subjective relationship to the present circumstances of a particular society. One‟s current 
experience of relative deprivation in South Africa is therefore also likely to influence the 
future that one foresees.  
 
Another variable that has been found to influence one‟s outlook to the future is that of 
identity. One‟s self identity has a direct influence on one‟s perception of the future 
(Grootboom, 2007). According to Social Identity Theory the social component of one‟s self-
concept consists of one‟s membership to various social groups (Tajfel, 1981 as cited in 
Bornman, in press). It follows that the social and political position of one‟s own group in 
relation to other relevant out-groups thus becomes of psychological significance to an 
individual and this may indeed influence one‟s social and political attitudes and behaviour 
(Brown, 1986 as cited in Bornman, in press). One‟s primary social group identification is thus 
also imagined to play a role in the future ideology that one constructs.  
 
These three variables shall be discussed in more detail in the sections to follow.  
 
2.5.1. Optimism to the future 
 
Directly after the first democratic elections of 1994 South Africans were overwhelmingly 
proud, happy and satisfied with life, and a decade later it seems as if little has changed. 
Mϕller (2007) reports that most South Africans are happy and optimistic about the future, 
and that they have seen improvements in their standards of living and quality of life. While 
she acknowledges that some are indeed still struggling and are growing impatient, these 
individuals are clearly the minority.  
 
Hamel, Brodie and Morin‟s (2005) findings lend support to those above. Their results reflect 
that 70% of South Africans are optimistic about the future, with black Africans being the most 
optimistic, followed by Indian/Asians and coloureds. White South Africans were found to be 
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the least optimistic about the future. This pattern seems to be consistent across surveys and 
studies that measure South Africans levels of optimism to the future. Black Africans are 
consistently found to display the highest levels of optimism, while whites have a strong 
tendency to yield the lowest scores on this measure. Surprisingly, those living in the worst 
conditions are the most optimistic and hopeful. Furthermore, black Africans at every poverty 
level were found to be more optimistic than white South Africans. When questioned about 
their levels of optimism in five core domains in South Africa, 75% of the respondents from 
Hamel et al.‟s (2005) study said that they expected improvements in education, 70% in race 
relations, 67% in the South African healthcare system, and 66% in the country‟s economy and 
the overall quality of life in South Africa.  
 
The respondents of the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey were asked whether they 
thought that the country was moving in the right direction. Their results revealed that 59% 
were of the opinion that the country was indeed moving in the right direction, while 
conversely 39% felt that the country was moving in the wrong direction, and 2% were unsure 
of how to answer this question. When the South African race groups were compared the black 
African group was clearly the most optimistic to the future as a disproportionate 65% of these 
respondents indicated that they felt the country was moving in the right direction. A low 36% 
of whites and 30% of Indian/Asians indicated as such, rendering these two groups the least 
optimistic of all the South African race groups in this instance. Forty-four percent of coloured 
respondents were of the opinion that the country was moving in the right direction (Daniel et 
al., 2006).  
 
The respondents who participated in the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey were then 
asked whether they felt that, in the next five years, life would improve for „people like them‟. 
Once again, black Africans were the most optimistic in this regard, as 48% of this group 
indicated that life would improve, while 22% felt that life would remain much the same, 18% 
foresaw worsening conditions, and 12% were unsure of how to answer. A low 15% of the 
white race group expected life to improve for them, 28% expected things to stay much as they 
were, 48% expected life to get worse, and 9% were uncertain of their sentiments in this 
regard. These results put this race group as the least optimistic. The coloured and 
Indian/Asian groups scored in between the black African and white groups (Daniel et al., 
2006). These authors suggest that, when one considers the lives of black South Africans 
during apartheid, it is not surprising that this group is consistently the most optimistic about 
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the present and future, as their lives under this oppressive administration were considerably 
worse than they are today. White South Africans, on the other hand, receive a higher quality 
of education, experience more affluent economic conditions, and have a better standard of 
living; however, they consistently are the most discontented and least optimistic of all the 
South African race groups. The authors advocate that this dissatisfaction may be due to a 
subconscious resentment that they no longer „run the show‟ as they did under the apartheid 
government.  
 
In terms of South Africans attitudes to poverty and inequality, the 2003 South African Social 
Attitudes Survey found that while black Africans were generally dissatisfied with their present 
conditions, they acknowledged nonetheless how their group‟s situation had improved 
significantly and their future outlook was positive. On the contrary, white South Africans 
were satisfied with their current situation, but said that their group‟s situation had worsened 
over time and these respondents perceived bleak future prospects for their group (Roberts, 
2006).  
 
 2.5.2. Relative deprivation 
 
South Africa remains one of the most inequitable societies in the world (Pillay, 2006) and the 
socio-economic gap that exists between the country‟s race groups is tremendous. Despite the 
rapid growth of the new black African middle class and the numerous strategies that 
government has implemented in order to alleviate poverty and enhance economic growth, the 
socio-economic discrepancies, between black and white South Africans in particular, are 
continuing, and even growing in some respects (Pillay, 2006). Large disparities exist in terms 
of employment, income and basic household facilities and as a result, South Africa remains a 
country of Haves (mainly white individuals) and Have-nots (mainly black individuals) 
(Hamel et al., 2005). This depiction of South Africa as being a country of „two nations‟ was 
even confirmed by the former president, Thabo Mbeki, who believed that large social divides 
still exist in the country (Dickow & Mϕller, 2002).  
 
The phenomenon of relative deprivation can be described as the discontent that arises from 
the subjective feeling of deprivation relative to another person or group (Sears, Freedman & 
Peplau, 1985). The emphasis on relative to is of great importance, because the deprivation 
that is experienced is not objective or absolute. Instead, it is a subjective and personal 
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experience that is highly dependent on how one perceives the discrepancy between one‟s lot 
and that of another‟s (Coser, 1967). Five preconditions must be met in order for the 
experience of relative deprivation to arise (Crosby as cited in Penrod, 1986): 
(1) the individual must see someone who possesses X;  
(2) the individual must then want X; 
(3) he/she must feel entitled to X; 
(4) he/she must feel that it is feasible to obtain X; and  
(5) he/she must not feel personally responsible for their lack of X.  
 
The literature distinguishes between egoistical and fraternal relative deprivation. While 
egoistical relative deprivation involves interpersonal comparisons and is therefore felt by an 
individual who compares his/her personal situation to that of another individual, fraternal 
relative deprivation involves an intergroup comparison and is thus experienced when the 
position of one‟s own group is compared to those of other groups (De La Rey & Raju, 1996; 
Grant & Brown, 1995). Gurr (1970 as cited in Appelgryn, 1991) contends that general living 
conditions (e.g. political rights, employment opportunities) that most people in a society 
consider to be essential are the means most relevant to a theory of relative deprivation, rather 
than more personalised means. This latter form of relative deprivation is what is likely to lead 
to collective social action (DeRidder, Schruijer & Tripathi, 1992). There is substantial 
evidence to support this assumption. Studies cited by DeRidder et al. (1992) (Caplan, 1970; 
Caplan & Paige, 1968) found fraternal deprivation to be predictive of negative intergroup 
behaviours, such as riots. Similarly, Dube and Guimond (1986 as cited by DeRidder et al., 
1992) found that group discontent was related to protests on university campuses, while Grant 
and Brown (1995) also found support for their hypothesis that the higher one‟s perception of 
fraternal deprivation, the more likely one will be to engage in collective social action. 
Appelgryn (1991) however, cautions that relative deprivation is simply a motivating variable 
that may serve to predispose one to such behaviour and is not a direct cause of collective 
social action. While Crosby‟s above discussion of the preconditions of relative deprivation 
relates more to the egoistical measure of relative deprivation, the underlying principles would 
also be applicable to the phenomenon of fraternal relative deprivation. Coser‟s (1967) 
explanation of how feelings of fraternal relative deprivation lead to collective social action 
justifies this. He explains that when the distribution of resources in a society is not in 
complete accordance with what individuals and groups consider their right, they begin to feel 
deprived and subsequently frustrated. If society does not allow these individuals to express 
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their feelings of discontent, they may thus resort to displaying behaviours that deviate from 
the norm and “departures from institutional requirements are to be expected” (Coser, 1967, 
p.30). As a result, conflict ensues in an effort to increase their sense of gratification.  
 
Mphuthing (1998) explains that, in South Africa, race is a prominent criterion for the 
distribution of wealth and resources, and this variable has therefore been the primary focus of 
studies that attempted to explore and measure relative deprivation, and there is in fact 
substantial evidence to point to the fact that black Africans experience considerably higher 
levels of relative deprivation than the rest of the South African race groups. Black Africans 
most often report „frequent shortages‟ of their basic needs, while coloured, Indian/Asian and 
white South Africans most often report either „rare shortages‟ or „complete satisfaction‟ of 
their basic needs (Hamel et al., 2005). Nearly a third of black Africans consider themselves to 
be „poor‟, while 47% said that they were just getting by, and 23% saw themselves as being 
„comfortable‟ or „wealthy‟. Forty percent of coloureds reported being comfortable or wealthy, 
while among Indian/Asians and whites, self-perceived poverty was virtually non-existent, 
with 60% and 77% of these respondents saying that they were comfortable or wealthy 
respectively (Roberts, 2006). Hamel et al. (2005) also confirm that the poverty levels of the 
coloured, Indian/Asian and white race groups are sharply reduced when compared to those of 
the black African group.  
 
Black South Africans are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their inferior conditions at 
present and are generally intolerant of the existing level of inequality in the country (Roberts, 
2006). This is evident from the regular strikes and protest actions that have arisen out of their 
dissatisfaction with housing provisions, service delivery, nepotism and corruption in 
government (Mϕller, 2007), among other factors. After the downfall of apartheid, this group 
expected their lives to improve considerably and for their basic needs to be met. However, 
this clearly did not materialize as they were hoping and as a result, they are becoming 
progressively more impatient.  
 
Mphuthing (1998), in her study of black South Africans‟ experiences of relative deprivation, 
found that black Africans perceived their socio-economic position to have improved 
significantly over the past few years, but this was still far below the position they felt they 
rightfully deserved. Furthermore, black Africans perceived white English- and Afrikaans-
speaking South Africans‟ to occupy significantly higher positions than they themselves did; 
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however, the Afrikaans position was seen as being greatly above what they were entitled to, 
while the English position was seen as being marginally above what they were entitled to. 
These findings clearly reflect the racial socio-economic disparities that were brought about by 
apartheid and that still continue to exist in modern day society.  
 
Socio-economic inequities and inter-racial relative deprivation are serious threats to a stable 
democracy (Mphuthing, 1998); however, the evidence suggests unfortunately that experiences 
of relative deprivation are rife in South Africa, particularly amongst the black African race 
group. It is highly likely therefore, that the discontent that arises from this experience will 
affect how one looks towards the future and the future ideology that one constructs.  
 
2.5.3.  South African‟s social group identifications  
 
The identities of different race groups, particularly within the South African context, are not 
likely to have remained stable over the years. Identities are never static, but dynamic, and 
changes in identity often coincide with changes in the social and political environment 
(Bornman, in press). The political transformation which changed the social, economic, 
educational and personal landscapes for all South African citizens also changed the ways in 
which members of different race groups identified with various identity categories.  
 
2.5.3.1. The national „South African‟ identity and the global „African‟ identity 
 
During the apartheid era South African citizens were categorised according to the official 
system of racial classification which saw an individual as belonging to one of four population 
groups: black, coloured, Indian/Asian and white. Consequently, identity formation during this 
period was primarily determined by this racial stratification. However, language, cultural 
and/or ethnic differences also exist within these four main racial groups (Bornman, in press). 
Due to the exclusionary nature of apartheid whereby „people of colour‟ were prohibited from 
being granted formal citizenship and were therefore not seen as being true South Africans, it 
is not surprising that the country‟s citizens failed to endorse a national South African identity. 
When democracy was brought about however, President Mandela attempted to promote such 
a national identity and in so doing bring about a sense of unity and nationhood (Bornman, in 
press). However, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Council (PAC) 
have historically endorsed an African identity rather than an exclusively South African 
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identity. During President Mbeki‟s leadership President Mandela‟s nation-building discourse 
was overlooked and support was instead given to embracing Africanism. However, a point of 
contention is whether this „African‟ identity also applies to white South Africans. If one takes 
Gibson and Gouws‟ (2000, as cited in Bornman, in press) findings into account, it would 
appear as if white South Africans do not consider this identity to pertain to them. These 
authors found that black Africans had a tendency to endorse the „African‟ identity, while 
white South Africans preferred to identify with the national „South African‟ identity. 
Bornman‟s (in press) findings lend support to the above. She found that in 1994 black 
Africans identified strongly with racial and ethnic identities. At this point in time they 
endorsed the „South African‟ identity more so than they did the „African‟ identity. However, 
in 2001 this changed considerably. While they still upheld racial and ethnic identities, 
identification with the „African‟ identity overtook that of the national identity and appeared to 
have become a primary identity for this race group. Bornman (in press) argues that the 
political transformation served not only to reunite black Africans with South Africa, but also 
with the rest of the world. They were once again able to freely embrace their African heritage 
and Africanism consequently became a primary identity. In 1994 white South Africans 
identified strongly with the national identity. In 2001 this had not changed.  
 
This pattern of the endorsement of the national identity appears to be relatively consistent 
across studies. In Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a) 1992 study, the white English-speaking 
group was the greatest endorser of the national South African identity. Their endorsement was 
followed by the white Afrikaans-speaking group, the Indian/Asian group and the coloured 
group. The black African group once again identified with the national identity the least.  
However, when these researchers conducted their second study four years later in 1996, they 
found that these identity preferences had changed quite considerably. The black African group 
still identified the least with the national identity and did thus not vary significantly over time. 
The white Afrikaans-speaking group however, identified more strongly with the national 
identity in 1996 than they did in 1992, while the white English-speaking group‟s 
identification decreased slightly. The most change occurred for the coloured and Indian/Asian 
race groups. Both groups endorsement of the national identity rose significantly from 1992 to 
1996. While the white English-speaking group identified more strongly with this identity than 
the black African group did, the importance that the former group placed on this identity was 
lower than that of the black African group. The researchers argue that the reason for the low 
identification of the black African group with the national identity is that they perhaps still 
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associate the label with the apartheid dispensation despite the change in government. While 
the black African group did not seem to identify strongly with the „South African‟ identity, 
they did however seem to show more support for the identity of „African‟. The authors point 
out however, that it was not certain whether black Africans perceived this identity to represent 
a global and continental „African‟ identity or whether they perceived it as a form of local 
ethnic identity.  
 
According to the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey, the national „South African‟ 
identity was found to have strengthened over the period of 1998 to 2000 (Grossber, Struwig & 
Pillay, 2006). Eighty-three percent of respondents said that they would rather be a citizen of 
South Africa than any other country in the world. The degree of identification with the 
national „South African‟ identity however, also varied markedly across the South African race 
groups. In stark contrast to the findings above, in this instance black Africans were now found 
to have the strongest sense of national identity, while whites had the weakest, and the 
coloured and Indian/Asian groups fell in between (Roefs, 2006).  
 
2.5.3.2. Racial/ethnic identity 
 
There seems to be some variance in the endorsement of racial/ethnic identities across studies.  
In Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a) 1992 study they found that the Indian/Asian race group 
was the strongest endorser of a racial/ethnic identity. Their score was followed by the white 
English-speaking group, the coloured group, and the white Afrikaans-speaking group. Black 
Africans were the weakest endorsers of this identity. In 1996 the white Afrikaans-speaking 
group‟s racial identification decreased making this group the weakest endorsers of this 
identity. While the proportions of black Africans who identified with their racial identity 
increased significantly from 1992 to 1996, the strength of their identifications did not reach 
the levels that were evident amongst the white English-speaking, coloured and Indian/Asian 
groups. In contrast to the findings above, the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey 
racial identity was found to be strongest amongst black Africans and weakest amongst 
coloureds. Yet another study conducted by Grootboom (2007) reports slightly different 
findings. He found that overall his sample of adolescents most strongly endorsed the Christian 
religion, followed by the national South African identity and then their racial classification. 
However, when he looked for racial differences, he discovered that coloureds and whites were 
similar in their identifications, as both groups placed more emphasis on the South African and 
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Christian identities followed by race, while the black African group conversely placed more 
importance on being black or African than they did on being South African or Christian. This 
researcher postulated that the heightened sense of racial identity amongst the coloured race 
group could perhaps be attributed to the limitations placed on their identity options. For 
example, black Africans can derive their identities from the particular ethnicities that are 
unique to the black African culture (e.g. Zulu or Xhosa), and therefore this group has a range 
of identities to choose from. He argues however, that the coloured group‟s choices have 
already been made for them politically, socially and by ancestry.   
 
The primary identities that characterise and have created tensions within South Africa are 
largely based on racial, ethnic, religious, gender and linguistic groupings (Grossber et al., 
2006), and one would therefore expect these identities, among others, to influence the future 
ideology that one constructs in a South African context.  
 
2.6. The current study 
 
The country‟s current political volatility signified the ideal time at which to conduct a further 
study on South Africans future ideologies. How does this current social, economic and 
political climate influence South Africans‟ views on the future of the country? The present 
study aims to arrive at an answer to this question by replicating Danziger‟s (1963) original 
study on future ideologies in the current above-portrayed context. The researcher aims to 
identify the predominant future ideologies that are present amongst University of the 
Witwatersrand‟s students‟, and to discover how these future ideologies differ across the South 
African race groups, as well as in terms of the primary social group identification that one 
upholds. She also intends to measure the levels of optimism to the future and the experiences 
of relative deprivation that are present amongst this sample, and ascertain whether these two 
variables influence the predominant future ideologies that one constructs.  
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Chapter Three 
Methods 
 
 
3.1.  Research Questions 
 
(1) What are the predominant future ideologies held by the University of the 
Witwatersrand students? 
(2) Are these predominant future ideologies associated with race? 
(3) Are these predominant future ideologies associated with primary social group 
identification? 
(4) What are the University of the Witwatersrand students‟ levels of optimism to the 
future of South Africa and are these levels of optimism associated with their 
predominant future ideologies? 
(5) What are the levels of relative deprivation experienced by the University of the 
Witwatersrand students and are these levels of relative deprivation associated with 
their predominant future ideologies? 
(6) Do the sample‟s primary social group identifications, levels of optimism to the future 
and levels of perceived relative deprivation predict the predominant future ideology 
that one constructs? 
 
 3.2.  Sample and Sampling 
 
Two hundred and twenty-three (n = 223) students at the University of the Witwatersrand who 
were registered for Psychology I comprised the sample of the present study. Participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 36 years and exhibited a mean age of 19.19 (SD = 2.01). The vast 
majority of the sample were first year Psychology students (n = 184; 82.51%); however, small 
proportions of second year (n = 29; 13.00%) and third year (n = 10; 4.48%) students were also 
completing the Psychology I module and they were therefore also included as part of the 
sample. The study‟s sample is however, neither representative of the Psychology I class nor 
the University.  
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Female participants, comprised 74.44% (n = 166) of the sample clearly outweighing the male 
participants, who only accounted for 25.56% (n = 57) of the current sample. The racial 
breakdown of the current sample was 50.67% (n = 113) black African participants, 7.62% (n 
= 17) coloured participants, 12.11% (n = 27) Indian/Asian participants and 29.6% (n = 66) 
white participants. According to a mid year 2009 population estimate conducted by Statistics 
South Africa, the study‟s proportions of the four main South African race groups are not 
consistent with national estimates, which puts black Africans at comprising 79.3% of the 
South African population, coloureds at 9.0%, Indian/Asians at 2.6% and whites at 9.1%. It is 
often questioned whether students from South African universities are indeed representative 
of the remainder of the South African population. From the demographic configuration of the 
current sample it would appear that this is not the case. Furthermore, the sample was neither 
representative of the University of the Witwatersrand population which, in 2009, put black 
Africans as comprising 55.3% of the university population, coloureds at 3.8%, Indians/Asians 
as 14% and whites as 27.5%. Each of the 11 official South African languages was reported as 
participants‟ first home languages, as well as Portuguese and Shona. English however, was 
the most commonly spoken home language with 51.57% (n = 115) of the sample speaking 
English at home. This was followed by isiZulu (n = 34; 15.25%), Setswana (n = 17; 7.62%), 
Sesotho (n = 13, 5.83%) and Sepedi (n = 12; 5.38%).   
 
It was initially hoped that the sample would consist of a sufficient number of white first 
language Afrikaans-speakers, so that comparisons could be made between the black African, 
coloured, Indian/Asian, white Afrikaans and white English groups, as was done in previous 
studies of this nature. Unfortunately, it was found that only 2 participants were in fact white 
first language Afrikaans-speakers, and this ethno-linguistic distinction could therefore not be 
included. Comparisons were instead made between the black African, coloured, Indian/Asian 
and white groups alone.  
 
The sampling method that was employed was that of convenience sampling. In sampling of 
this nature the researcher makes a limited attempt to ensure that the sample is an accurate 
representation of the target population and therefore he/she cannot reliably generalize the 
results of such a sample to the entire target population. As this form of sampling does not 
involve the random selection of individuals for inclusion in the study, it is by definition a 
form of non-probability sampling. While the obvious shortcoming of this strategy is that each 
individual in the population is not guaranteed an equal chance of being included in the sample 
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(Whitley, 2002), non-probability sampling is however, a convenient and economical form of 
sampling.  
 
3.3.  Research Design 
 
Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected for analysis in the current study and the 
research endeavour therefore followed a mixed methods approach. As data was collected at 
one point in time, the study was cross-sectional in nature (Whitley, 2002). Furthermore, 
because the study did not involve the manipulation of the independent variable, the presence 
of a control group or the random assignment of participants to various study conditions, it 
adheres to a non-experimental design. The primary shortcoming of such a design is that none 
of the three criteria that are necessary to establish causality (i.e. temporal precedence, non-
spuriousness, and covariation) are met, and therefore cause and effect relationships cannot be 
determined. However, non-experimental research is useful for descriptive purposes, and 
trends can be established if measures are repeated and replicated. Furthermore, non-
experimental designs are relatively easy to carry out, and are time and cost efficient. While it 
follows that the results of this non-experimental research cannot be generalized to the entire 
South African population, as would be ideal, they are nonetheless still highly interesting and 
potentially significant, and should therefore be carefully considered and not underestimated.  
 
3.4.  Instruments 
A questionnaire consisting of five sections was constructed. 
 
 
3.4.1. Demographic Section 
 
A set of demographic questions (Appendix D) were used to obtain information from the 
participants pertaining to their age, gender, race, home language and year of study.  
 
3.4.2. Essay 
 
Participants were required to write a brief essay, of no more than three pages, on the history 
of South Africa projected into the future (Appendix E). They were told to imagine that they 
were historians writing in the year 2060 and to outline what they thought the history of South 
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Africa would be during the period 2009 to 2060 and to give an account of things that they 
thought are likely to happen in this period. Participants were provided with four lined pages 
on which to complete their essays. The content of these essays was analyzed to identify the 
predominant future ideologies held by University of the Witwatersrand students.  
 
3.4.3. Group Identification Check List 
 
A simple group identification checklist (Appendix F) was used to discover how the sample 
defined themselves in terms of their identities. This scale consisted of a list of 32 possible 
identities which included: gender (female/male); race (black, coloured, Indian/Asian, white); 
home language (Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiZulu, isiXhosa, Setswana, Xitsonga, 
Tshivenda, siSwati, Sesotho, Sepedi); ethnicity (Ndebele, Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Tsonga, 
Venda, Swati, Sotho); religious group (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim), as well 
as a „South African‟ identity option and an „African‟ identity option. Participants were asked 
to mark off as many of these identities as applied to them. Thereafter, the scale consisted of 
an additional component where participants were asked to list their various identities in the 
order of their importance to the participant, where 1 is representative of their most important 
identity and 5 is representative of their least important identity.  This identification scale 
closely resembles that used in a study by Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a), but has been 
slightly altered and expanded.  
 
3.4.4. Optimism scale 
 
A 7-item optimism scale (Appendix G) was used to assess the sample‟s level of optimism 
towards the future of South Africa. The first six items pertain to six broad areas in South 
Africa: education, crime, health care, race relations, quality of life and the economy. 
Participants were asked to indicate on a 5-point response scale whether they thought that 
conditions will get worse (1), stay the same (3) or improve (5) in each of these areas. Higher 
scores are indicative of greater optimism towards the future, whereas lower scores are 
indicative of low optimism towards the future. The seventh item required participants to 
indicate, on the same response scale, how they thought the financial situation of future 
generations will compare to their own financial situation today. The average score of these 7 
items was obtained and utilized in the study. This optimism scale was created for use in a 
survey of South Africa ten years into the new democracy by Hamel et al. (2005) and 
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generated a very satisfactory Cronbach‟s Alpha score of 0.87. However, this original scale 
included only a 3-point rating scale, and for the purposes of the current study it was decided 
to expand these limited response options to 5 rating points.  
 
3.4.5. Relative Deprivation-Gratification scale 
 
This 8-item scale measures a general state of relative deprivation-gratification (Appendix H). 
Each item was responded to on a 5-point response scale. For items 1 and 3, the scale points 
ranged from 1 (very satisfied) to 5 (very dissatisfied). For items 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 the scale 
points ranged from 1 (much better) to 5 (much worse). Higher scores are indicative of greater 
perceived relative deprivation, while lower scores are indicative of greater perceived relative 
gratification. Once again the average score of these 8 items was obtained and utilized in the 
current study. This scale was constructed for use in a study conducted by Dambrun, Taylor, 
McDonald, Crush and Méot (2006) and yielded a satisfactory Cronbach‟s Alpha score of 
0.76.  
 
3.5.  Procedures 
 
The study‟s data was collected from students in first year Psychology tutorials at the 
University of the Witwatersrand. The first year Psychology course and tutorial coordinator 
granted permission to the researcher to use the tutorial students as participants for the study 
(Appendix A). On the day of administration the researcher introduced herself to the tutorial 
students and explained that she was conducting research on University of the Witwatersrand 
students‟ perceptions of the future of South Africa. The students were informed that 
participation in the study required them to write an essay, of no more than 3 pages, on the 
projected future history of South Africa, as well as to complete four simple scales. Thereafter, 
all ethical issues were conveyed to the students (right to withdraw, etc) and the students were 
then invited to participate in the study. They were told that their informed consent to 
participate would be assumed if they agreed to complete a questionnaire booklet. All the 
above information also appeared on the participant information sheet (Appendix B) which 
was attached to the top of the questionnaire booklets. Participants were allowed to keep this 
sheet. The questionnaire booklets were then administered to those students who wished to 
participate in the study and the entire 45-minute tutorial period was allowed for completion. 
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The researcher collected data from 6 tutorials in total. Furthermore, all data was collected 
before South Africa held its fourth democratic elections on the 22
nd
 of April, 2009, as it was 
envisaged that, with all the hype and anticipation surrounding this important event, the results 
that emerged from the study would be more interesting. 
 
3.6.  Data Analysis 
 
 3.6.1. Internal consistency and normality 
 
As published internal consistency is often considered when one selects an instrument for use 
in a study, calculating a Cronbach Alpha statistic is of great importance. Furthermore, the 
internal consistency of a measure is related to the chance that significant results will be found, 
and is also an indication of the internal validity of one‟s research (Devlin, 2006). Therefore, 
Cronbach Alpha‟s were calculated for the optimism and relative deprivation scales to 
determine the internal consistencies of these scales. This measure varies between zero and one 
and is indicative of the extent to which each item on a particular scale relates to every other 
item on that scale (Devlin, 2006).  
 
Tests for normality allow one to obtain estimates of the characteristics of the population one 
is investigating (Devlin, 2006). Parametric tests assume that a sample is normally distributed 
and therefore, allows estimates pertaining to the population to be made. In non-parametric 
tests a normally distributed sample is not a necessary requirement, but if this requirement is 
not met then estimates pertaining to the characteristics of the population can therefore not be 
made. Distribution analyses were run for the optimism and relative deprivation scales, and the 
skewness and kurtosis coefficients were used to establish whether each scale was sufficiently 
close to a normal distribution.  
 
3.6.2. Demographic characteristics of the sample 
 
Simple frequency analyses were performed to determine the frequencies and proportions of 
each of the demographic variables of interest in the current study.  
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3.6.3. Predominant future ideologies 
 
Quantitative thematic content analyses were used to identify the predominant future 
ideologies that emerged from the essays written by the study‟s participants. The essays‟ 
emerging themes were initially classified in accordance with Danziger‟s original 1956 
classification system, which included the categories of Conservative, Technicist, 
Catastrophic, Liberal and Revolutionary. However, two additional categories, Socialist and 
Social Democratic/Redress, that were used by Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a) in their 1996 
studies were also included. Those essays which did not present a definable future were 
categorised as Unclassifiable. The table below depicts the study‟s original classification 
system and provides definitions of the original future ideologies.  
 
Table 1. Definitions of the predominant future ideologies. 
Conservative The existing political order should return to the separatist system of the 
Apartheid regime (for comparison sake this definition of Conservatism 
was kept to be the same as the pre-1994 definition and is not in actual 
fact the true definition of Conservatism).  
Technicist The existing political order will remain relatively unchanged. However, 
the main changes that society will undergo will be in the form of 
technological and material transformations. These technical advances 
and related economic development will lead to improved conditions of 
life.  
Catastrophic The existing political order is leading the country into a disastrous 
future characterized by economic decline, crime and disorder. Things 
will go from bad to worse and there is little that can be done to prevent 
this from happening. There is fatalistic acceptance of this inevitable 
deteriorating situation.  
Liberal The existing political order will be gradually and smoothly improved 
through peaceful transformation. Conflicts will be resolved amicably 
and conditions of life will improve for all. A more just political order 
will ensue.   
Revolutionary Irreconcilable differences exist between different groups in the existing 
political order and therefore change can only be brought about through 
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violent means. The existing political order must be overthrown with 
violent force and a new social order must be created.  
Socialist The existing political order has failed to achieve economic justice and 
this has resulted in great discontent amongst the masses. A communist 
future is desired. Land and resources should be redistributed amongst 
South African citizens and in so doing, poverty can be eradicated.  
Social 
Democratic/Redress 
The existing political order will remain relatively unchanged. However, 
conditions in the country will improve by means of government 
interventions that aim to promote disadvantaged groups and eradicate 
poverty. Policies of redress (affirmative action, housing development, 
education) are central to this future.  
Unclassifiable No predominant future ideology emerged in the essay. The essay does 
not present a definable future.  
 
The researcher began the analysis process by coding the essays into the above-specified 
categories, but intended to re-conceptualize this original classification system if it were to be 
found that particular categories in this system were not applicable in the current study. 
Furthermore, she planned to formulate definitions for any new categories that emerged 
beyond the original system.  
In addition, each essay was also analyzed for a future valence: positive, negative, neutral, or 
mixed. Essays that portrayed an overall positive view of the future were assigned a positive 
valence, while those that portrayed an overall negative view of the future were conversely 
assigned a negative valence. A neutral valence was allocated to those essays which emerged 
as having an overall neutral perspective on the future, whereas a mixed valence was assigned 
to essays that were positive regarding some aspects of the future and equally negative about 
other aspects, and therefore displayed mixed feelings towards the future.  
 
Simple frequency analyses were conducted to determine the frequencies of future ideologies 
and future valences that emerged from the essays. A Chi-squared cross tabulation was also 
run to determine the proportions of future valences to each future ideology.  
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3.6.4. Perceptions of the present  
 
During the categorization process the researcher discovered that a surprisingly large 
proportion of the sample appeared to be fixated on the present conditions in South Africa and 
were using their essays as a way to vent about the present state of the nation. Those essays in 
which participants wrote only about the present were seen as not answering the essay question 
posed to participants in the questionnaire booklet and were therefore separated from the rest 
of the essays. These essays were however, still seen as being of interest, and were therefore 
included in a secondary analysis.  
 
Those participants who discussed the present tended to do so by referring specifically to 
certain aspects or sectors of South Africa. Therefore, these essays were first read over and, by 
means of a qualitative thematic content analysis, common themes that emerged from the essay 
content were grouped together as „present categories‟. A total of 21 thematic categories were 
uncovered: Black Economic Empowerment, corruption, crime, development, the economy, 
education, the 2009 elections, emigration, greed, healthcare, HIV/AIDS, the justice system, 
government leadership, living conditions, politics, poverty, race relations, skills, teenage 
pregnancy, unemployment, and Jacob Zuma. Once these categories had been established, 
further quantitative thematic content analyses were then performed, whereby each essay was 
assigned to the above categories, depending on what aspects of the present were discussed 
within it. Most essays discussed more than one of the above categories and were thus assigned 
to multiple categories.  
 
Each one of this sample of essays was then analyzed for the perspective taken on each of the 
present categories (i.e. valence). If an essay made a positive reference to the present state of 
„development‟ in South Africa, for example, it was given a positive valence for this particular 
category. If an essay mentioned „crime‟ in a negative sense, this category was assigned a 
negative valence for that particular essay. Essays that were neutral in their perspectives on the 
current state of the „economy‟, for example, were assigned neutral valences for this category; 
and if an essay made both positive and negative references to „education‟, for example, this 
category was given a mixed valence. Naturally, if an essay failed to discuss a particular 
category it was not assigned a valence. Frequency analyses were then performed to discover 
how many participants discussed each of the present categories, and how many participants 
were positive, negative, neutral or mixed in their perceptions of the various present categories.  
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In addition, overall present valences were then calculated for those essays that made some 
mention of the present. These present valences were similarly positive, negative, neutral or 
mixed. Essays that portrayed an overall positive view of the present were assigned a positive 
valence, while those that portrayed an overall negative view of the present were conversely 
assigned a negative valence. A neutral valence was allocated to those essays which emerged 
as having an overall neutral perspective on the present, whereas a mixed valence was assigned 
to essays that were positive regarding some aspects of the present and equally negative about 
other aspects, and therefore displayed mixed feelings about the present conditions of the 
country.  
 
 3.6.5. Inter-rater reliability 
 
While the coding of the demographic questionnaire, the identification scale, the optimism 
scale and the relative deprivation-gratification scale were expected to be relatively 
unproblematic, as the bulk of these questionnaires could be coded numerically and could thus 
be easily entered into an Excel spreadsheet, it was thought possible that the researcher‟s 
subjectivity might influence the manner in which the essays were categorized. Therefore, to 
ensure that the essays were coded in as an objective manner as possible, every tenth essay was 
independently cross-checked by the researcher‟s supervisor. This coding was double-blind, as 
the supervisor was initially unaware of the researcher‟s categorization of a particular essay.  
 
The researcher‟s categorization of an essay and her supervisor‟s categorization of the same 
essay was then compared and checked for their levels of agreement. The inter-rater reliability 
of this categorisation process was then constructed. This form of reliability is the degree of 
agreement among raters and it gives a score of how much consensus there is in the ratings 
given by the various raters. The joint-probability of agreement was the measure of inter-rater 
reliability made use of in the current study. This is a simple measure that assumes the data is 
entirely nominal. It is the number of times that each rating is assigned by each rater divided 
by the total number of ratings, but does not take into account that agreement may happen 
entirely by chance (Uebersax, 1987).  
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3.6.6. Future ideologies and present perceptions by race 
 
A number of Chi-Squared cross tabulations were run to determine which predominant future 
ideologies emerged among each of the four South African race groups, and which future 
valences were held by each of these groups. Similarly, the numbers of essays that discussed 
only the future, those that discussed the present only, and those essays that discussed both the 
future and the present, were calculated per race group by means of Chi-Squared cross 
tabulations. Present valences were also calculated in this manner. The frequencies of each 
race group who referred to each of the 21 present categories were also worked out by means 
of a Chi-Squared cross tabulation.  
 
3.6.7. Social group identification 
 
To determine how members of each race group identified themselves in terms of each of the 
32 possible identities provided in the Identification Scale, Chi-Squared cross tabulations were 
computed. The level of importance that each race group placed on each of these 32 identities 
then needed to be ascertained. Again, this was determined by means of a Chi-Squared cross 
tabulation analysis.  
 
The identities were then clustered into the following broad groups: South African, African, 
race, gender, religion, and ethno-linguistic, and the numbers of participants who identified 
one of these groups as of primary importance to their identity were calculated per race group. 
Chi-Squared cross tabulations were then conducted to determine whether any significant 
association existed between participants‟ future ideologies and their primary identification.  
 
3.6.8. Optimism to the future 
 
A two-independent sample t-test was run to determine whether those who expressed a 
positive future valence and those who expressed a negative future valence differed in their 
levels of optimism towards the future as reflected by their scores on the Optimism scale.  
 
An additional two-independent sample t-test was conducted to establish whether differences 
existed between the black African and white race groups levels of optimism towards the 
future, while a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to ascertain whether 
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there existed a difference in the degree of optimism to the future for those who expressed 
Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies.  
 
3.6.9. Relative deprivation 
 
Whether a significant difference exists between levels of perceived relative deprivation for the 
black African and white race groups was determined by means of a two-independent sample 
t-test.  Hereafter, separate t-tests were run for each individual item of the relative deprivation 
scale by race, while a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) attempted to answer 
whether a difference exists in the degree of perceived relative deprivation for each scale item 
for those who expressed Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies.  
 
3.6.10. Primary social group identification, Optimism and Relative Deprivation 
 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to establish whether a difference 
exists in the samples degree of optimism to the future and perceived relative deprivation 
based on their primary identifications of the national South African identity, the continental 
African identity, race, gender, religion, or ethno-linguistic identity.  
 
Lastly, a generalized logistic regression was run to determine whether one‟s optimism 
towards the future, level of perceived relative deprivation or primary social group identity 
predicts which future ideology one holds. A logistic regression, sometimes called the logistic 
model or logit model, is used to predict the probability of an event occurring by fitting the 
data to a logistic curve. It is a generalized linear model used for binomial regression and it 
makes use of several predictor variables that are either numerical or categorical.  
 
3.7.  Ethical Considerations 
 
The present study was granted ethical approval by means of an internal ethics panel 
committee (Ethics protocol number: MPSYC/09/005). Please see Appendix C for the Ethics 
Clearance Certificate.  
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Students were not pressured into participation in any way. The researcher made it clear to the 
tutorial students that participation in the study was completely voluntary and that no student 
would be advantaged or disadvantaged in any way for choosing to partake in the study or not 
partake in the study. There were a handful of students from each of the 6 tutorials who did in 
fact decline to participate and were then allowed the tutorial period to complete other work. 
The fact that these particular students did not feel pressured into participation likely reflects 
that those who did agree to participate in the study did not do so under pressure. As no 
identifying information was requested from participants and the collected questionnaire 
booklets were not specified by tutorial group, complete anonymity was guaranteed. 
Furthermore, participants‟ responses were kept absolutely confidential, as access to the 
questionnaire booklets was restricted to the researcher and her supervisor. Participants were 
informed that their informed consent to participate in the study would be assumed if they 
chose to complete a questionnaire booklet. However, should they wish to withdraw from the 
study after having given their informed consent they were under no obligation to continue 
completing the questionnaire booklet and could withdraw whenever they wished to do so. 
Deception did not constitute an ethical breach in the current study as participants were fully 
informed of the nature of the research. Furthermore, it was not envisaged that a study of this 
nature would put participants in danger or at risk of any kind. However, to err on the side of 
caution, the researcher made it known to the sample that if they felt that the content of the 
study had adversely affected them in any way they could visit the Careers and Counselling 
Development Unit (CCDU) on the University of the Witwatersrand campus for the necessary 
counselling. Those participants who personally requested to be debriefed on completion of the 
research were e-mailed a brief summary of the research findings. All the above information 
was communicated clearly to the participants and also appeared on the participant information 
sheet which students were told they could keep. The researchers e-mail address, as well as the 
e-mail address of her supervisor, appeared on this sheet. It was decided by the researcher and 
her supervisor that the data collected from the participants would not be destroyed 
immediately after it had been coded and analyzed. Instead, it shall be kept for the requisite 
five years after the research has been submitted as a thesis and destroyed only after this five 
year period. 
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Chapter Four 
Results 
 
 
4.1.  Internal consistency and normality 
 
The optimism scale yielded a satisfactory Cronbach Alpha score of 0.81, while that of the 
relative deprivation scale was far less pleasing at 0.58. However, excluding the relative 
deprivation items with low item-total correlations did nothing to improve this internal 
consistency coefficient, and all the original items were thus included.  
 
Distribution analyses were then performed to determine the distribution of the summated 
scores of the two scales. Both the optimism and relative deprivation scales had skewness and 
kurtosis scores between -1.0 and +1.0 and were thus acceptably close to normality. However, 
due to the problem of low internal consistency associated with the latter scale, distribution 
analyses were run for the entire relative deprivation scale, as well as for each relative 
deprivation scale item to determine whether any of these items were skewed. The eighth item 
was found to be positively skewed, but a log transformation corrected this deviation. 
Table 2 summarises the normality results for the two scales.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistic results for the distribution analyses. 
 
Scale Mean Standard 
deviation 
Skewness  
 
Kurtosis 
 
Optimism scale 
 
 
2.97 
 
0.87 
 
0.03 
 
-0.53 
 
Relative Deprivation Scale: overall 
 
 
2.73 
 
0.52 
 
0.33 
 
0.72 
 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 1 
At the moment are you satisfied/dissatisfied with your personal 
economic conditions? 
 
 
 
3.28 
 
 
1.23 
 
 
-0.23 
 
 
-0.78 
 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 2 
Do you expect that your personal economic conditions will get 
better/same/worse one year from now? 
 
 
 
2.48 
 
 
1.04 
 
 
0.15 
 
 
-0.77 
 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 3 
At the moment are you satisfied/dissatisfied with economic 
conditions in South Africa? 
 
 
 
3.86 
 
 
0.94 
 
 
-0.55 
 
 
-0.10 
 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 4 
Do you expect that economic conditions in South Africa will get 
better/same/worse one year from now? 
 
 
 
3.05 
 
 
1.08 
 
 
-0.14 
 
 
-0.64 
 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 5 
Would you say that your overall personal conditions are 
better/same/worse than those of other South Africans? 
 
 
 
2.13 
 
 
0.97 
 
 
0.67 
 
 
0.22 
 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 6 
Would you say that your overall personal conditions are 
better/same/worse as other members of your population group? 
 
 
 
2.32 
 
 
0.92 
 
 
0.12 
 
 
-0.67 
 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 7 
Would you say that the overall conditions of people from your 
population group are better/same/worse than those of other groups 
in South Africa? 
 
 
 
2.84 
 
 
1.21 
 
 
0.20 
 
 
-0.98 
 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 8 
Would you say that the overall conditions in South Africa are 
better/same/worse than those in other southern African countries? 
 
 
 
1.88 
 
 
0.89 
 
 
1.18 
 
 
1.51 
 
Relative Deprivation Scale: transformed item 8 
 
 
0.53 
 
0.45 
 
0.19 
 
0.86 
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4.2.  Re-conceptualisation of the original essay classification system  
 
The classification system used by Finchilescu and Dawes was assessed in the light of the 
present essays to determine whether the categories were still applicable, or whether new 
categories were found to emerge. The Conservative ideology did not emerge at all in the 
current study and was thus removed. Moreover, the Social Democratic/Redress ideology 
proved to be a problematic category, as there was no real way of distinguishing the difference 
between this ideology and the Liberal ideology. It would appear as if the Social 
Democratic/Redress ideology has essentially become a standard for Liberalism. The Social 
Democratic/Redress ideology was therefore incorporated into the Liberal ideology. The 
Catastrophic outlook also proved to be slightly problematic, as many essays portrayed a 
negative view of general future deterioration, but did not satisfy the extreme perception of 
impending catastrophe. A less extreme form of the Catastrophic ideology was thus 
constructed and was named Deterioration. The table below provides the definitions of the two 
new future ideologies.  
 
Table. 3. The definitions of the two new future ideologies. 
 
Liberal/ Social 
Democratic-
Redress 
The existing political order will be gradually and smoothly improved 
through peaceful transformation. Conflicts will be resolved amicably, 
and conditions of life will improve for all by means of government 
interventions that aim to promote disadvantaged groups and eradicate 
poverty, and policies of redress (affirmative action, housing 
development, education). A more just political order will ensue. 
Deterioration The existing political order is causing conditions in the country to 
deteriorate. Things will go from bad to worse and there is little that can 
be done to prevent this from happening. There is fatalistic acceptance 
of this inevitable deteriorating situation. 
 
It was found that essays often portrayed multiple ideologies (e.g. Technicist and Liberal), 
which rendered the coding process difficult at times. Furthermore, in numerous cases it was 
found that an entire essay was written in a Catastrophic sense, for example, but the very last 
sentence or paragraph, depicted an entirely opposite outlook (e.g. Liberal). Therefore, in order 
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to make the analysis process less complicated, the dominant future ideology was sought from 
each essay and coded in accordance with this prevailing outlook.  
 
4.3.  Examples of the future scenarios 
 
Eight extracts taken from those essays that best epitomized the definitions of each of the 
seven future ideology categories are provided below. An extract from an essay which 
discussed only the present state of South Africa is also provided as an example of this separate 
sample of essays.  
 
Liberal 
 
Change in South Africa was a slow process, and did not pick up any quantifiable speed 
until the [late] 2010‟s or early 2020‟s. By this time, the older generations, who lived 
during the apartheid era, were either retired or passed away. This allowed the younger 
generations to step up into [positions] of power, and it was a hive when racial 
[prejudice] was finally simmering down into non-[existence].  
The economic climate of South Africa improved due to cancellation of [affirmative] 
action. South Africans of all ethnic groups were recognised for their ability alone and 
thus prompted a new era of productiveness. Furthermore, because ability was the 
deciding factory, the general [disposition] of South Africans increased, and fewer 
people complained about their lot in life.  
Stronger currency eventually led to South Africa being recognised in 2030 as a 
developed nation. Proper government strategies regarding issues like housing, water 
and food led to lower poverty, and a movement towards recognising new and viable 
careers (eg Art/drama) resulted in higher employment rates. Birth restrictions in the 
2020‟s and 2030‟s led to a more stable and sustainable population.  
Because the era of „transformation‟ had ended, more money was available for 
education and healthcare. New schools were built, as well as new hospitals. Increased 
budgets for universities and training hospitals meant more and better trained doctors, 
nurses and other healthcare workers. An increase in teacher‟s salaries also resulted in 
more motivated teachers. A final curriculum for schools was decided on in the 2010‟s, 
and this also [led] to a better education. Larger government subsidies towards 
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universities meant that more people could afford higher education, and other areas of 
importance, like engineering and science, improved dramatically.  
A more competitive, capitalist business world resulted in increasing independent 
telecommunications companies and electricity companies. Besides creating additional 
employment, this also resulted in more of these services to be available to more people, 
at better prices.  
Government employees started to be paid on a productivity-basis. This resulted in 
greater efficiency. The police, fire department and traffic officials were paid more, 
which lessened corruption, and encouraged more individuals to join. Crime was thus 
lessened.  
Political parties in SA joined together to form 2 parties. Thus, SA became a true 
democracy, and one party was not able to dominate, as, if they were unable to meet 
their promises people voted for the other party.  
Ultimately, the situation in SA improved from 2009 to 2060.  
 
(white second year male) 
Deterioration  
 
During this 50 year period I believe things in South Africa will get worse than they 
already are.  
I believe the crime rate will increase as the population is increasing rapidly in South 
Africa and eventually it will reach a point where not all south Africans will be able to 
be employed as there are only a certain amount of jobs available. This will lead to 
people resorting to other ways to survive such as robbery and theft etc.  
I also believe the quality of education received in South Africa will decrease as there 
are a shortage of teachers so many [under-qualified] people are being employed as 
teachers thus decreasing the quality of education, because of this eventually the 
economy and other such things will be affected as people, leaders etc in the future will 
not be as educated as the people today and thus will not have enough knowledge to run 
the country as it should be run.  
Another reason for believing South Africa will be worse in 50 years time is the 
government. If we do not have proper, fair, law abiding leaders how do we expect any 
country to move forward? 
 
(Indian/Asian first year female) 
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Catastrophic  
 
The 2009 elections in South Africa led to the onset of the decline of the country‟s 
economy, political stability and social standing. The rise in crime, racism, corruption 
and poor governance led to a slow fall of the South African economy as a whole, 
including their trade relations. Corruption and racist policies in government aided in 
this fall, as well as in the decline of international support of the country. Socially, the 
country was not dissimilar to a “reverse Apartheid” a few years after the election. This 
is why, in 2060, we find ourselves living in a country similar to that of Robert 
Mugabe‟s Zimbabwe in 2009. But at least now, South African fits in better with its 
neighbours and the rest of Africa. The humorous prophecy of 2009 seems to have 
come true: “Last one out of the airport, please turn out the lights.” 
 
(white first year female) 
 
Technicist 
 
There may be positive changes in the future of South Africa, but that can only be 
possible if the Government makes its contribution. So a lot could happen we may not 
even have the ruling parties present today, we will have new parties. People would live 
in an age of technology that is so advanced that we would no longer have people to do 
labour but instead rely on Technology to go about your daily life.  
Even though things may seem tough at the moment, there will be a positive change in 
the near future, People of the future don‟t even have to worry about things like 
recession, because such a thing wouldn‟t exist by that time.  
Things will actually be so different that one cannot really predict how things will 
change in 2060. If you have a basic understanding of how the system works [a lot] can 
be said, because of such huge technological development and infrastructure change it 
could definitely be possible to erode poverty and give everybody an equal opportunity. 
Look we have already changed so much, You can only imagine what things would be 
like. South Africa could even be one of the most [wealthy] countries in the world if the 
make the correct choices in the Government and economy.  
 
(Indian/Asian first year female) 
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Revolutionary 
 
This is a list of things that shall happen from 2009 to 2060: 
1) Jacob Zuma shall come into power.  
2) Education will go down.  
3) Piracy shall rise.  
4) Crime will get slightly higher. 
5) The economy will crash.  
6) Prices for food & land shall go up.  
7) AIDS virus will increase.  
8) Poverty will rise.  
9) Employment rates will go down.  
10) Inexperienced people will get jobs over others.  
11) Suicide rates will go up.  
12) South Africa will [lose] its bid for the 2010 World Cup.  
13) The rand shall lose it‟s value.  
14) It will cost billions, perhaps trillions of rands to buy a newspaper, toilet paper.  
15) Smoking shall increase.  
16) Students will boycott schools, colleges or universities.  
17) White farmers shall loose their farms.  
18) Underprivileged black people will only get poorer.  
19) Governmental officials will be assassinated.  
20) Protests will break out involving young people. 
21) People shall be divided & moved into different locations depending on their  
income & how they can help the country.  
22) No one shall be allowed to enter or leave the country.  
23) Importing & exporting shall stop.  
24) Refugees will be murdered or forced out of our country.  
25) Homosexuals will also be either locked up, executed or forced to leave & not  
allowed to vote.  
26) The people will begin to starve & people will loose their right to vote.  
27) Buildings will be bombed or destroyed by extremists.  
28) People will plot to overthrow the government.  
29) A revolution will break out, against the people that were divided in to the poor   
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areas and the people who were divided into the “richer” areas.  
30) The ruling party shall leave the country or shall be murdered during the revolution.  
31) Famine & disease will rise.  
32) War shall break out during the revolution.  
33) Many shall be murdered or executed.  
34) Camps for prisoners shall be set up to lock up political prisoners.  
35) Robben Island shall be bombed & destroyed.  
36) The President @ the time shall finally be assassinated after his tyrannous reign.  
37) A new political party will rise, in hopes of restoring the blistered country that was     
       once beautiful.  
 
(white second year male) 
 
Socialist 
 
South Africa as a nation has radically changed. The government, economy and society 
have all changed.  
The democracy has been replaced for a communist state. Capital has been equally 
shared amongst the poor. People no longer work to earn and gratify their own well 
being but work towards a common good. The government is a combined unit made up 
of the DA, ANC and Cope, and tribalism has been diluted.  
The economy is mostly generated by means of agriculture and mining, and foreign 
investment has ever more increased. South Africa has finally made its mark on the 
world, and is ranked as one of the world superpowers.  
As for the working class, their money is re-invested into the country and poverty has 
been done away with.  
Education has improved and high school and university standards have been levelled 
out. Pollution has decreased since the introduction of hydro-operating cars and traffic 
has been cut down by the increase in usage of public transport.  
 
(black African first year female) 
 
Unclassifiable 
 
After the elections and the ANC winning them again, Jacob Zuma will become 
president of this country. ANC will probably win the elections because people vote out 
of loyalty instead of assessing the situation. Politically, most things will stay the same 
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because our parents‟ generation [doesn‟t] want to vote for a political party that has a 
white leader because they don‟t want a repeat of apartheid.  
The world cup in 2010 will be attended mostly by people from outside South Africa 
because tickets prices cost almost as much as school fees. The hosting country, which 
is us, will watch from the wonderful seats of our own home.  
Inflation is going to keep going up. People‟s economic standing will pretty much stay 
the same because that‟s how it has always been. The saying “the rich get richer and the 
poor get poorer” is very true.  
With all the students in tertiary studying civil engineering we‟re going to have a great 
boom, then a shortage of work for those people.  
 
(black African second year female) 
 
 
Present 
 
Starting with the political things or aspects of South Africa currently it is evident that 
there is [a lot] of political instability and socio-economic problems facing this country. 
South Africa is currently facing problems that might be a hindrance in the future. The 
few problems that South Africa is facing is the problem of corruption in the state 
government. There is [a lot] of mistrust going around because people around the 
country feel that the most powerful and dominant can actually get away with murder, 
for them if you are rich and powerful you are above the law or justice. A typical 
example is the one from the currently African National Party (ANC) president Jacob 
Zuma (JZ) (2009). He was suspected that he was part of a corruption scheme with his 
dear friend Shabir Shaik, and unfortunately for Shabir, he was found guilty while his 
acquaintance was freed. Such things really make people think about the future 
president of the country and how it is going to be [run]. Later during his arrest Shaik 
was later released due to his health problems. This was said to be the hardest thing one 
can obtain in South Africa. The same president again was a rape suspect earlier in his 
corruption year. The government is trying by all means to empower the less privileged 
and previously disadvantaged, the organisation or idea is called the BEE now BBEE. 
Though this has raised some questions about the new imbalances by the new 
government. People, particularly white males feel that the BEE or BBEE is another 
form of separation and division and that it threatens the working white class because 
jobs are given to the black males or black females with skills and experiences and the 
 52 
first to be retrenched are the white males. Research has shown that people at university 
level do drop out of university because they are unable to cope with the workload and 
university life style. Thus people feel that education from high school is not as the way 
it should be. There are still so many socio-economic problems facing South Africa like 
poverty, lack of skills, unemployment, teenage pregnancy, crime, suicides, etc. That I 
would like to elaborate on later. One can therefore conclude by saying that the country 
is on the brink of collapse.  
 
(black African first year female) 
 
* A number of spelling mistakes were identified in the above extracts and were corrected 
accordingly. These words have been encased within square brackets to indicate their prior 
incorrectness.  
 
4.4.  Inter-rater reliability 
 
Sixteen essays were independently cross-checked by the researcher‟s supervisor. Essays in 
which participants wrote only about the present conditions in the country were excluded from 
this analysis. At first the researcher and her supervisor disagreed about the categorization of 
four essays, putting the initial inter-rater reliability score at 75%. It was then decided that the 
essay categories needed to perhaps be re-conceptualized and reconstructed. After the removal 
of the Conservative ideology, the addition of the Deterioration ideology and the 
amalgamation of the Liberal and Social Democratic Redress categories, the same sample of 
essays was re-coded and the inter-rater reliability score was found to have improved to 
93.75%, signifying that the categorization of only 1 essay was disagreed upon.  
 
4.5.  What are the samples predominant future ideologies? 
 
Of the sample participants, 31.84% (n = 71) were liberal in their outlook to the future, while 
19.73% (n = 44) held future ideologies of Deterioration and 11.66% (n = 26) were 
Catastrophic in their views of the future. However, when the future ideologies of 
Deterioration and Catastrophe are combined to constitute an overarching ideology of future 
deterioration and decline, it was found that 31.39% (n = 70) of the sample adopt this 
worsening future perception. A Revolutionary ideology was held by seven participants 
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(3.14%); a Technicist ideology by five participants (2.24%); and a Socialist ideology by three 
participants (1.35%). Thirty-three essays in total (14.80%) did not present a definable future, 
and could not be placed into any of the future categories, rendering them Unclassifiable.  
 
While 101 essays (45.29%) effectively answered the essay question by discussing only the 
prospective future of South Africa, 34 essays (15.25%) discussed only the present conditions 
in the country and did therefore not present any future ideology as such. The remaining 88 
essays (39.46%) discussed the future, but also referred in part, to the present state of the 
country.  The graph below depicts the percentages of the respective future ideologies held by 
the sample and is based on all the analysed essays. A table of the abovementioned future 
ideology frequencies and percentages can be found in the appendices section as Appendix I 
(Table 4).  
 
Figure 1. The percentages of the samples predominant future ideologies.  
 
Ninety-two participants (41.26%) expressed positive future valences and were thus optimistic 
to the future. Slightly fewer participants (n = 87, 39.01%) conveyed negative future valences 
and were therefore pessimistic in their attitudes to the future. Three participants (1.35%) 
expressed neither optimism nor pessimism to the future, and thus took on a neutral stance to 
future happenings, while seven (3.14%) expressed both positive and negative future 
viewpoints and were therefore assigned mixed future valences. Naturally, those essays (n = 
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34) which wrote only about the present and did not refer at all to the future could not be 
assigned a future valence. This amounted to 15.25% of the essays, while the remaining 
84.75% could be coded for a future valence. The proportions of the future valences that 
emerged from the samples essays are depicted in the graph below. A table representing these 
particular frequencies and percentages appears as Appendix J (Table 5).  
 
Figure 2. The percentages of the valences of the future essays. 
 
A cross tabulation analysis uncovered that each participant who was Liberal in their future 
outlook expressed a positive future valence (n = 71, 100.00%), while those who adopted 
ideologies of Deterioration (n = 44, 100.00%) and Catastrophe (n = 26, 100.00%) were all 
negative in their valences to the future. While the valences of the abovementioned future 
ideologies seem to flow out of the categories definitions (e.g. Liberalism encompasses a 
positive outlook to the future, while Deterioration and Catastrophe encompass negative 
outlooks), the remaining future ideologies conversely have the potential to be either positive 
or negative. Technicist ideologies expressed consistently positive future views (n = 5, 
100.00%). Three participants (42.86%) who expressed Revolutionary future ideologies did so 
in a positive manner, while the remaining four (57.14%) envisioned the prospective 
revolution as a negative outcome. Two of the participants (66.67%) who expressed a Socialist 
future ideology referred to this outcome in a negative sense, while the remaining one 
(33.33%) participant seemed to believe that this future would be a positive one. Twelve 
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(36.36%) unclassifiable essays expressed optimism to the future; 11 (33.33%) were 
pessimistic in their future valences; three (9.09%) were neutral; and seven (21.21%) 
expressed both optimism and pessimism to the future, and were therefore mixed in their 
future outlooks.  
 
The graph below depicts the results of this cross tabulation analysis, while a table that 
portrays the precise frequencies and percentages of the future valences by each future 
ideology can be accessed as Appendix K (Table 6).  
 
Figure 3. The percentages of the future valences by each future ideology.  
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valences.  In addition, a content analysis of these essays produced 21 themes. These thematic 
categories will be discussed below.  
 
The results reveal that this particular sample of essays was disproportionately negative in their 
perceptions on the current circumstances in South Africa, as only 9.42% (n = 21) of these 
essays expressed positive views on the current South African situation, while 36.77% (n = 82) 
were conversely negative in their perceptions. Ten essays (4.48%) discussed the present in a 
relatively neutral manner, while nine (4.04%) essays had both positive and negative things to 
say about the present state of affairs. The graph below illustrates the percentages of the 
present valences of those participants who discussed the present in their essays, while Table 7 
represents a more accurate depiction of these figures and appears as Appendix L.   
 
Figure 4. The percentages of the samples present valences.  
 
The results depict that the sample is generally dissatisfied with the current education system, 
healthcare system, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the justice system, skills, unemployment levels, 
poverty, current living conditions in the country, the receding economy and the ubiquitous 
problem of crime. Very few participants had positive things to say about each of the 
abovementioned aspects. Furthermore, the sample was negative in their overall opinions of 
Black Economic Empowerment; and teenage pregnancy and emigration were further sources 
of disgruntlement. There were mixed feelings regarding development in the country with five 
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participants expressing their dissatisfaction at the current standard of development, and five 
participants expressing the opposite sentiment. Race relations were another area on which 
varied opinions were conveyed. Eight participants felt that race relations had improved in the 
country, while 11 were of the view that there still remains a great deal of animosity between 
the South African race groups. A further finding was that participants used their essays to 
express their frustrations with the growing immorality that seems to be rife in the South 
African government, as corruption and greed were widely spoken of. It follows that South 
African politics and leadership were both topics that were not spoken of very highly. It is not 
surprising therefore, that the 2009 elections were a source of excitement to some and 
pessimistic anticipation to others. Much negative talk also centred round the ANC president 
Jacob Zuma, with participants‟ referring to him mainly in connection with his corruption 
charges. A few participants did, however, speak favourably of Mr. Zuma.   
The graph below illustrates the abovementioned findings. Table 8 in the appendix section 
(Appendix M) offers a more complete breakdown of the proportions of the sample who spoke 
positively, negatively, or neutrally with reference to each of the 21 present categories. 
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Figure 5. The percentages of the samples positive, negative and neutral perceptions of the 
present categories.  
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4.7.  What are the samples future ideologies and future valences by race? 
 
Thirty-eight (52.78%) black Africans were Liberal in their future outlooks, while 26.39% (n = 
9) of this group foresaw deteriorating conditions in the country‟s future, and 11.11% (n = 8) 
felt that a Catastrophic future lay ahead. However, when the ideologies of Deterioration and 
Catastrophe were combined and considered as a singular ideology of future deterioration and 
decline, it was found that 37.50% (n = 27) of the black African race group foresaw such a 
future. The Technicist, Revolutionary and Socialist ideologies emerged to a considerably 
lesser extent amongst this group, with two, three and two essays expressing these respective 
ideologies. Seventeen (15.04%) essays did not present any definable future and were thus 
Unclassifiable, and 24 (21.24%) black Africans discussed only the present in their essays.  
 
Among the coloured participants, a future outlook of deterioration was most common (n = 8, 
61.54%), followed by Liberal (n = 4, 30.77%). One participant perceived a Catastrophic 
future. However, when the categories of Deterioration and Catastrophe are once again 
combined, it would appear as if more than half of the coloured participants in the sample 
foresaw a future of general deterioration (n = 9, 69.23%). The Technicist, Revolutionary, and 
Socialist ideologies did not emerge at all among this race group. A single essay was deemed 
Unclassifiable, and three coloured participants wrote only of the present in their essays.  
 
Futures of Deterioration and Catastrophe were perceived for 26.32% (n = 5) and 22.22% (n = 
6) of the Indian/Asian portion of the sample respectively. Considering the above two 
categories together, it is clear that the majority of this race group (n = 11, 57.9%) anticipate a 
future of general deterioration, while 37.58% (n = 6) are Liberal in their future outlooks. 
Furthermore, two Indian/Asian participants‟ expressed Technicist ideologies. In total, five 
(18.52%) of the Indian/Asian essays were coded as Unclassifiable, and three (11.11%) 
referred only to the present.  
 
Liberalism and Deterioration/Catastrophe were represented exactly equally among the 
samples white race group. Nearly 44.23% (n = 23) of this group predicted each of these 
categories. Considered separately, it appears as if white participants foresee Deterioration in 
the future (n = 12, 23.08%) more so than they do Catastrophe (n = 11, 21.15%), but this 
difference is only by one participant. Technicist and Socialist ideologies were each expressed 
by one white participant, while four (7.69%) whites anticipated a Revolutionary future. Just 
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over 15% (n = 10) of this samples‟ essays were Unclassifiable, and four white participants (n 
= 6.06%) wrote only of the present conditions in the country.  
 
A significant difference was not found to exist between race and the various future ideologies, 
2   
(21, N = 223) = 30.74, p= 0.0782. 
 
The graph below is an illustration of these findings. For a more complete breakdown of the 
frequencies and percentages of the various future ideology categories per race group Table 9 
can be considered in the appendix section (Appendix N).  
 
Figure 6. The percentages of the future ideologies per race group.  
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participant each was neutral to the future, and mixed in their feelings towards the future.  
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(23.53%) expressing positive valences. Neutral and mixed attitudes to the future did not 
emerge among this group.  
 
Similarly, Indian/Asian participants were also predominantly negative in their views of the 
future (n = 12, 44.44%). Thirty-three percent (n = 9) of this group did however, have 
optimistic outlooks. Three participants in total were neutral (n = 1) and mixed (n = 2) in their 
judgments. It must be noted however, that the coloured and Indian groups were too small to 
draw any definitive conclusions from.  
 
The white race group within the current sample seem to be divided in their perspectives on the 
future, with 43.94% (n = 29) of this group expressing negative future valences and a slightly 
lower 42.42% (n = 28) expressing positive future valences. A single white participant took on 
a neutral stance to the future, while four conveyed mixed feelings about what is to come. The 
graph below demonstrates these results, while a table of these findings also appears as 
Appendix O (Table 10).  
 
Figure 7. The percentages of the samples future valences by race group.  
 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Positive Negative Neutral Mixed
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
s 
o
f 
th
e
 f
u
tu
re
 v
al
e
n
ce
s
Black African Coloured Indian/Asian White
 62 
4.8.  What are the samples‟ present perceptions and present valences by race? 
 
The results depict that 58.41% (n = 66) of the black African race group used their essays as a 
way in which to divulge their responses and sentiments to various conditions in the country at 
present. Twenty-four (21.24%) of these individuals strayed completely from the essay topic 
writing only of the present, while 42 (37.17%) wrote of the present, but did also write of the 
future. Essentially, only 47 (41.59%) black African participants answered the essay question 
by anticipating the future alone.  
 
The coloured and Indian/Asian race groups appear to be more fixated on the present 
conditions in the country than the black African and white races, as 76.47% (n = 13) of 
coloured participants and 62.96% (n = 17) of Indian/Asian participants discussed the present 
in their essays. Of these proportions, 17.65% (n = 3) of coloured individuals and 11.11% (n = 
3) of Indian/Asian participants wrote only of the present, while 58.82% (n = 10) of the 
coloured group and 51.85% (n = 14) of the Indian/Asian sample discussed both the present 
and the future. A mere four coloured participants (23.53%) wrote only of the future as was 
specified by the essay topic. A slightly higher percentage of 37.04% (n = 10) Indian/Asians 
wrote only of the future.  
 
The white race group appears to have understood the essay task requirements best, as 60.61% 
(n = 40) of white participants wrote only of the future. In total, 39.36% (n = 26) made some 
mention of the present in their essays, but of these, most (n = 22, 33.33%) discussed the future 
in conjunction with the present. Only four white participants (6.06%) wrote of the present 
alone.  
 
The black African race group had more to say about each of the 21 present categories, except 
that of Emigration and Race Relations, when compared to the other three race groups. All 
four race groups had a lot to say about corruption, the receding economy, South African 
leadership, politics, and Jacob Zuma. Discussions of the 2009 elections featured frequently 
among the coloured and Indian/Asian race groups, while crime and race relations seemed to 
be of more importance to the white race group.  
 
 63 
A more comprehensive breakdown of the ways in which each of the present categories was 
spoken of per race group is available in the table below. The percentages represent the 
proportion of those who discussed each of the present categories out of all those participants 
who made some mention of the present in their essays.  
 
Table 11. Frequencies of the samples positive, negative and neutral perceptions of the present 
categories by race group.  
Present 
Category 
Valence  Black 
African 
Coloured Indian/ 
Asian 
White Total 
 
Black 
Economic 
Empowerment 
Positive 2 - - - 2 
Negative 7 - 2 1 10 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 9 
7.38% 
- 2 
1.64% 
1 
0.82%% 
12 
9.84% 
 
 
Corruption 
Positive - - - - - 
Negative 21 5 5 9 40 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 21 
17.21% 
5 
4.10% 
5 
4.10% 
9 
7.38% 
40 
32.79% 
 
 
Crime 
Positive - - - - - 
Negative 11 3 4 7 25 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 11 
9.02% 
3 
2.46% 
4 
3.28% 
7 
5.74% 
25 
20.49% 
 
 
Development 
Positive 4 - 1 - 5 
Negative 5 - - - 5 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 9 
7.38% 
- 1 
0.82% 
- 10 
8.20% 
 
 
Economy 
Positive 3 - 1 2 6 
Negative 22 6 3 6 37 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 25 
 20.49% 
6 
5.90% 
4 
3.28% 
8 
6.56% 
43 
35.25% 
 
 
Education 
Positive 3 - - - 3 
Negative 7 1 4 5 17 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 10 
8.20% 
1 
0.82% 
4 
3.28% 
5 
4.10% 
20 
16.39% 
 
 
Elections 
Positive 4 3 - 2 9 
Negative 5 5 3 1 14 
Neutral 1 - 2 1 4 
Total 10 
8.20% 
8 
6.56% 
5 
4.10% 
4 
3.28% 
27 
22.13% 
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Emigration 
Positive - - - - - 
Negative 1 - - 2 3 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 1 
1.52% 
- - 2 
1.64% 
3 
2.46% 
 
Greed 
Positive - - - - - 
Negative 8 1 - 2 11 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 8 
6.56% 
1 
0.82% 
- 2 
1.64% 
11 
9.02% 
 
 
Healthcare 
Positive 1 - - - 1 
Negative 5 1 - 1 7 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 6 
5.90% 
1 
0.82% 
- 1 
0.82% 
8 
6.56% 
 
 
HIV/AIDS 
Positive 2 - - - 2 
Negative 5 - - 3 8 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 7 
5.74% 
- - 3 
2.46% 
10 
8.20% 
 
Justice 
System 
Positive - - - - - 
Negative 1 - 1 1 3 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 1 
1.52% 
- 1 
0.82% 
1 
0.82% 
3 
2.46% 
 
 
Leadership 
Positive 1 - - - 1 
Negative 21 4 5 7 37 
Neutral 2 - - - 2 
Total 24 
19.67% 
4 
3.28% 
5 
4.10% 
7 
5.74% 
40 
32.79% 
 
Living 
Conditions 
Positive 1 - - - 1 
Negative 5 1 1 2 9 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 6 
5.90% 
1 
0.82% 
1 
0.82% 
2 
1.64% 
10 
8.20% 
 
 
Politics 
Positive 2 - 1 3 6 
Negative 20 4 3 4 31 
Neutral 1 - - 1 2 
Total 23 
18.85% 
4 
3.28% 
4 
3.28% 
8 
6.56% 
39 
31.97% 
 
 
Poverty 
Positive - - - - - 
Negative 10 1 1 5 17 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 10 
8.20% 
1 
0.82% 
1 
0.82% 
5 
4.10% 
17 
13.94% 
 
 
Race 
Relations 
Positive 4 1 - 3 8 
Negative 4 1 1 5 11 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 8 2 1 8 19 
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6.56% 1.64% 0.82% 
 
6.56% 15.57% 
 
 
Skills 
Positive 1 - - - 1 
Negative 3 1 1 - 5 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 4 
3.28% 
1 
0.82% 
1 
0.82% 
 
- 6 
4.92% 
 
Teenage 
Pregnancy 
Positive - - - - 4 
Negative 4 - - - - 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 4 
3.28% 
- - - 4 
3.28% 
 
 
Unemployment 
Positive - - 1 - 1 
Negative 6 2 - 1 9 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 6 
5.90% 
2 
1.64% 
1 
0.82% 
1 
0.82% 
10 
9.18% 
 
Jacob 
Zuma 
Positive 4 - - 1 5 
Negative 13 5 4 9 31 
Neutral - - - - - 
Total 17 
13.94% 
5 
4.10% 
4 
3.28% 
10 
8.20% 
36 
29.51% 
 
 
Those who discussed the present in their essays did so mainly in a negative manner, with 82 
participants portraying negative present valences and only 21 portraying positive attitudes to 
the present conditions in the country. All the race groups were more negative in their overall 
opinions of the present than they were positive, with the coloured race group being the most 
negative of all the race groups (n = 12, 70.59%). When compared to the other three race 
groups, the black African participants were the most positive in their views of the present 
state of South Africa. The graph below is an illustration of these findings, while Table 12 
(Appendix P) can be considered for a more accurate representation of these figures.  
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Figure 8. The percentages of the samples overall present valences per race group.  
 
 
4.9.  Comparison between the present study‟s findings and those of past studies 
(1963 – 1996) 
 
The findings seem to convey that the black African race group generally uphold Liberal 
perceptions of the future. While most of these respondents (46.4%) were Revolutionary in 
their future outlooks in the 1963 study, followed by Liberal (22.6%), they endorsed the 
Liberal outlook most strongly in each subsequent study. This endorsement of the Liberal 
ideology seemed to rise steadily from the 1963 study onwards and it peaked in 1992 when 
87.5% of the black African participants perceived the future in a Liberal manner. Acceptance 
of the Catastrophic future ideology varied quite considerably from study to study. A low 4.8% 
of black African respondents upheld this ideology in 1963. Belief in this ideology had become 
slightly stronger in 1981 and peaked in 1992 with 7.1% of black African respondents 
endorsing this outlook. 1996 saw the lowest proportion of black Africans (1.9%) upholding 
this perspective. However, the results of the current study seem to reflect that this ideology is 
on the increase among the black African race group, as the endorsement of this future 
orientation reached its peak in the 2009 study. When the Catastrophic ideology is coupled 
with the Deterioration ideology however, the results seem to reflect that a relatively high 
proportion of black Africans are indeed negative in their overall perceptions of the future at 
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present, as close to 38% of these respondents foresaw a future of general deterioration and 
decline. There was very little support for the Technicist ideology in 1963 (1.2%) and there 
remains little support for it today among the black African race group, as only 2.8% of this 
group‟s respondents endorsed this ideology in the current study. The endorsement of this 
ideology was at its highest in 1981 with 16% of black Africans upholding this view. The 
Technicist ideology did not appear at all in the 1992 and 1996 studies. Support for the 
Revolutionary ideology was at its highest in 1963 among black Africans and it was noticed to 
have dropped quite considerably in 1981 (25%). This ideology did not appear at all in the 
1992 and 1996 studies, and in the current study very few black African respondents endorsed 
this view of the future (4.2%). Thirteen percent of the black African race group upheld 
Conservative outlooks in 1963. In 1981 this figure dropped by more than half (6%), and in all 
subsequent studies it did not emerge at all.  
 
When the findings for the white
1
 group are considered it emerges that this group has remained 
consistently Catastrophic in their future outlooks over the years, with the exception of the 
current study. From 1963 to 1996 white respondents upheld predominantly Catastrophic 
views on the future. In 1963, 31.8% of whites endorsed Catastrophic ideologies. This figure 
seemed to rise steadily over the years and peaked in 1992 with 44.1% of respondents 
upholding this belief. 1996 saw quite a considerable drop in numbers of supporters for this 
future orientation (18.7%), while the results of the current study show a slight increase. The 
Catastrophic ideology emerged as the third most commonly held future ideology amongst the 
white race group at the present time. However, when the Catastrophic and Deterioration 
ideologies are considered together, it becomes clear that 44.2% of whites foresee a future of 
overall deterioration and decline. However, an equal proportion of whites endorsed the 
Liberal ideology. Support for this ideology was fairly erratic over the years. In 1963, 19.1% 
of whites foresaw a Liberal future; in 1981 this figure dropped to 15% of whites; by 1992 it 
had more than doubled (30.8%); in 1996 it dropped to a low of 6.4% of respondents; and it 
was found to have reached its peak during the current study (44.2%). The white race group 
showed their highest levels of support for the Technicist ideology in 1963. Hereafter, their 
endorsement of this ideology waned significantly from year to year. At the present time only 
1.9% of whites uphold this view of the future. Very few whites (2%) were Revolutionary in 
                                                 
1
 It is important to note that the white English-speaking and white Afrikaans-speaking groups in previous years 
were not amalgamated for comparison with the 2009 study. Only the white English-speaking groups are 
considered in this comparison.  
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1963 at the start of this research; however, by 1981 this had become their second most 
commonly held ideology, with 20% of white respondents holding this view of the future. 
Hereafter, belief in this future orientation dropped considerably and in 1996 it did not emerge 
at all. A small proportion of whites (7.7%) however, have adopted a Revolutionary 
perspective in present day South Africa. Conservatism declined steadily over the years among 
the white race group. Just more than a fifth of white respondents were Conservative in the 
1963 study; by 1981 this figure had dropped to 13%; and by 1992 it had dropped even lower 
to 3.5% of respondents. This ideology did not emerge at all in the 1996 and current studies.  
 
Comparisons of the future ideologies for the coloured and Indian/Asian race groups shall not 
be made due to the low sample sizes of these two groups.  
 
The graph below conveys the abovementioned findings. The essays written by both the 14- 
and 17-year cohorts in Finchilescu and Dawes‟ (1999a) study were combined for the purposes 
of this comparison. Unclassifiable essays make up the difference between 100% and the top 
of the respective bars. A table of these exact percentages is available as Appendix Q (Table 
13). 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of the frequencies of the future ideologies appearing in 1963, 1981, 
1992, 1996 and 2009. 
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4.10.  What are the samples social group identities?  
 
The first section of the social group identification checklist required participants to simply 
mark off as many of 32 possible identities as applied to them. From the analysis of this scale 
segment, it was found that the African identity was most strongly held by black African 
participants as 83.19% (n = 94) of this race group identified with this identity category. Only 
36.36% (n = 24), 35.29% (n = 6) and 11.11% (n = 3) of white, coloured and Indian/Asian 
participants respectively identified with this identity.  
 
Conversely, it would appear as if being South African is a widespread identity held among 
white participants, as 95.45% (n = 63) of these participants selected this identity option. It 
seems to be least identified by black Africans, as only 81.42% (n = 92) of this group 
identified as being South African. The coloured and Indian/Asian race groups fell in between 
the white and black groups with coloured participants identifying more strongly as South 
African than the Indian/Asian group. This difference for which race group identifies more as 
South African was found to be significant only between black Africans and whites, 
2   
(1, N = 
179) = 7.07, p= .00522. The coloured and Indian/Asian groups could not be included in this 
analysis as there were too few people who comprised these two groups.  
 
Racial identity is recognized strongly by each of the race groups, but seems to be strongest 
among the white race group (n = 62; 93.94%), followed by Indian/Asians (n = 25; 92.59%), 
coloureds (n = 15; 88.24%) and black Africans (n = 94; 83.19%).  
 
Gender is also a strongly held identity among the four race groups. All white participants (n = 
66; 100.00%) identified with gender, while only 96.30% (n = 26) of Indian/Asians, 95.57% (n 
= 108) of black Africans and 94.12% (n = 16) of coloureds identified with this category.  
 
All coloured and Indian/Asian participants identified with a religious group. For coloureds, 
this religion was mainly Christianity (n = 11; 64.71%), while 48.15% (n = 13) of 
Indian/Asians identified as being Hindu and 29.63% (n = 8) identified as belonging to the 
Muslim faith. Nearly 77% (n = 87) of the black African sample identified with a religious 
group. The results reflect that most black Africans are Christians (n = 86; 76.11%). Whites 
were found to identify the least with a religious identity, with only 69.7% (n = 46) of white 
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participants selecting a religious identity option. Of these 46 white participants, 32 (48.48%) 
identified as being Christian, putting Christianity as the most affirmed white religion.  
 
Language was a strongly held identity for the black African race group with all participants 
identifying that they spoke at least one of the 11 official South African languages. Nearly half 
(n = 54; 47.77%) of the black African sample however, spoke more than one language. 
English was identified as being spoken by 49.56% (n = 56) of black African participants. 
IsiZulu was the next most commonly spoken language (n = 23; 20.35%), followed by Sesotho 
(n = 19; 16.81%) and Setswana (n = 18; 15.93%). All coloured and white participants also 
identified with a particular language, with eight (47.06%) coloured participants and seven 
(10.61%) white participants speaking more than one language. Only 81.48% (n = 22) of 
Indian/Asians selected a language identity. The results show that this race group identifies 
only with speaking English, while coloureds and whites identified as speaking both Afrikaans 
and English. 
 
An ethnic/tribal identity was acknowledged by all black Africans with 11 (9.71%) of these 
participants identifying as belonging to more than one of these ethnicities. The Zulu ethnicity 
was identified by 36.28% (n = 41) of the black African sample, followed by Sotho (n = 22; 
19.47%) and Tswana (n = 17; 15.04%).  
 
From the above results, it is clear that the most commonly held identities for black Africans 
are language, followed by ethnicity, gender, race/ African, nationality, and religion. For 
coloured participants language was also most important, but it was followed by religion, 
gender, race/nationality, and the African identity. Overall, Indian/Asians identified most 
strongly with their religious group, followed by their gender, race, nationality, language, and 
the African identity being of least importance to them, while the white race group 
acknowledged language as most important to their identities, pursued by gender, nationality, 
race, religion, and the African identity. 
 
The graph below represents these results, while Table 14 (Appendix R) also summarises the 
abovementioned social group identification results.  
  
 
Figure 10. The percentages of the samples social group identities by race.   
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4.11.  What are the samples primary social group identities? 
 
The second section of the social group identification checklist required participants to rank 
the identities that they selected in the first section of the scale in the order of their importance 
to the participant, where 1 was indicative of their most important identity and 5 was indicative 
of their least important identity. Only identities of primary importance were then considered. 
In total, 14 participants did not complete the second section of this scale, of which nine were 
black African, one was coloured, two were Indian/Asian and two were white.  
 
Twenty-four (23.08%) black African participants selected an African identity as being their 
most important identity, while only three (18.75%) coloured participants and one (1.56%) 
white participant did so. No Indian/Asian participants specified this identity as important to 
them. It must be noted that some respondents could have regarded this identity as being a 
continental African identity, while others may have considered it as being analogous to the 
black African racial identity.   
 
Being South African appeared to be a more important identity to each of the race groups, as 
24 (23.08%) black Africans, five (31.25%) coloureds, five (20.00%) Indian/Asians and 19 
(29.69%) whites identified the South African nationality as most important to their social 
group identification. These differences however, were not found to be significant between all 
four race groups, 
2   
(3, N = 209) = 1.59, p=.66114, or even between black Africans and 
whites only, 
2   
(1, N = 168) = 0.91, p=.21947.  
 
When race was considered as an identity of primary importance, black Africans were found 
to place the most importance on this category as part of their identity, followed by coloureds, 
Indian/Asians and whites. This difference was found to be significant between the four race 
groups, 
2   
(3, N = 209) = 12.50, p=.00585; however, the expected frequencies were lower 
than five in two instances. Consequently, the same analysis was run again between the black 
African and white race groups only, and a significant difference was found once again, 
2   
(1, 
N = 168) = 10.68, p=.00058, indicating that race is of more importance to black Africans than 
it is to whites.  
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Conversely, gender appears to be of more significance to the primary identities of whites 
when all four race groups are compared, 
2   
(3, N = 209) = 11.80, p=.00810, and it becomes 
even more significant when only black Africans and whites are compared, 
2   
(1, N = 168) = 
9.86, p=.00188. Nineteen (29.69%) white participants indicated their gender as of primary 
importance to them, while only 11 (10.58%) black African participants, one coloured 
participant, and four (16.00%) Indian/Asians did so.  
 
Indian/Asians most often identified religion as of primary importance to their identities (n = 
12; 48.00%), followed by black Africans (n = 29; 27.88%), coloureds (n = 4; 25.00%), and 
whites (n = 13; 20.31%), but this difference was not significant for all race groups, 
2   
(3, N = 
209) = 6.94, p=.07384, as well as for black Africans and whites only, 
2   
(1, N = 168) = 1.21, 
p=.17989.  
 
The expected frequencies for the coloured (n = 0) and Indian/Asian (n = 2; 8.00%) race 
groups in terms of ethno-linguistic identity were too low to allow for all race groups to be 
compared, and so only black African and white participants were compared in terms of ethno-
linguistic primary identification. Eight (7.69%) black Africans and five (7.81%) whites 
selected a ethno-linguistic category as of primary importance to them, but this difference was 
not very large and naturally failed to be of significance, 
2   
(1, N = 168) = 0.001, p=.59794.  
 
The graph below illustrates the abovementioned findings and Table 15 in the appendix section 
(Appendix S) also presents the frequencies and percentage values of those participants from 
each race group who acknowledged one of the six identity categories as of primary 
importance to their identity.  
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Figure 11. The percentages of the samples primary social group identifications.  
 
When the association between the primary identity categories and the Liberal, Deterioration 
and Catastrophic future ideologies was considered, it was found that those participants who 
expressed Liberal ideologies most commonly identified with being South African (n = 19; 
31.15%) followed by their religious group (n = 18; 29.51%), while those who expressed 
future outlooks of Deterioration most often identified with their religion (n = 10; 29.41%) 
followed by their gender (n = 8; 23.53%). Participants who foresaw Catastrophic futures most 
commonly identified with their national South African identity, gender and religion.  
 
Table 16 depicts the frequencies and percentages of the primary social identities of those 
participants who expressed Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies and can be 
found in the appendix section as Appendix T. The graph below also illustrates these results.  
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Figure 12. The frequencies of the samples primary social group identifications by the Liberal, 
Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies.  
 
 
4.12.  To what extent are the participants optimistic towards the future of South Africa 
and are these levels of optimism associated with their predominant future 
ideologies? 
 
An overall mean of 2.97 (SD = 0.87) was obtained for the Optimism scale. This scale ranged 
from a lowest response rating of 1, which was indicative of low optimism to the future, to a 
highest response rating of 5, which was indicative of high optimism to the future. This mean 
of 2.97 converges closely upon the mid-point of the Optimism scale which signifies that in 
general the sample anticipates that things will stay much the same in South Africa over the 
next five years, rather than improving or getting worse.  
 
It was found furthermore, by means of a two-independent sample t-test, that those who 
expressed optimism towards the future in their essays, in the form of positive future valences, 
were significantly more optimistic in their scores on the Optimism scale, t(173) = 8.47, 
p<.0001. The mean score on the Optimism scale for those participants who expressed positive 
future valences in their essays was 3.42 (SD = 0.75), while the average for those who 
expressed negative future valences in their essays was 2.44 (SD = 0.08).  
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When the levels of optimism for the black African and white race groups were compared, it 
was revealed that the former group was significantly more optimistic (M = 3.23, SD = 0.08) 
towards the future of the country, as reflected by their scores on the Optimism scale, than was 
the white race group (M = 2.66, SD = 0.09), t(173) = 4.81, p<.0001.  
 
A one-way analysis of variance then found that a significant difference does in fact exist in 
the degree of optimism to the future for those whose essays expressed Liberal, Deterioration, 
and Catastrophic future ideologies, F(2, 136) = 69.38, p<.0001. Those who portrayed Liberal 
ideologies were more optimistic towards the future of South Africa (M = 3.52, SD = 0.74) 
than were those who portrayed Deterioration (M = 2.51, SD = 0.66) and Catastrophic 
ideologies (M = 1.85, SD = 0.44). A Tukey‟s Studentized Range test further revealed that the 
differences between the optimism means for all the ideologies - Liberal, Deterioration and 
Catastrophic - were statistically significant.  
 
4.13.  What are the samples levels of relative deprivation and are these levels of 
relative deprivation associated with their predominant future ideologies? 
 
An overall mean of 2.73 (SD = 0.52) was obtained for the Relative Deprivation scale. This 
scale ranges from a lowest response option of 1, which is indicative of low perceived relative 
deprivation, to a highest response option of 5, which is indicative of high perceived relative 
deprivation. This mean therefore denotes a relatively moderate level of relative deprivation 
for the sample overall.  
 
An initial analysis was made comparing the black African and white race groups on the full 
relative deprivation scale. It was found that black Africans experienced greater perceived 
relative deprivation (M = 2.75, SD = 0.05) than their white counterparts (M = 2.67, SD = 
0.05), but as can be seen from the minimal difference between their respective means this 
variation was not significant at 5%, t(175) = 1.01, p=0.3148. As there were too few coloured 
and Indian/Asian participants these two race groups were not included in this comparison. 
However, due to the low score of internal consistency that was obtained previously for this 
particular scale, it was decided to consider each relative deprivation scale item separately by 
means of a multivariate analysis of variance. This test revealed that a significant difference 
does in fact exist between the black African and white race groups when each separate 
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relative deprivation scale item is considered, F(8, 162) = 14.86, p<0.0001). This result refers 
to the conversion of the Wilks‟ Lambda from the MANOVA.  
 
When levels of relative deprivation for each scale item were compared for these two race 
groups, it was found that black Africans feel significantly more dissatisfied with their 
personal economic conditions (M = 3.52, SD = 0.1.13) than whites at present (M = 3, SD = 
1.25) (t(123) = 2.75, p=0.0069), but that the black African group expects their personal 
economic conditions to get better in the future (M = 2.18, SD = 1.03) in comparison to whites 
(M = 2.88, SD = 0.90) (t(146) = -4.68, p<.0001). When it comes to overall economic 
conditions in South Africa, the results reveal that whites are more dissatisfied with the current 
economic situation in the country (M = 4, SD = 0.81) when compared to black Africans (M = 
3.71, SD = 0.97) (t(153) = -2.06, p=0.0406). Both race groups however, expect the overall 
economic conditions in South Africa to worsen in the near future, with whites expecting 
conditions to worsen to a greater extent (M = 3.37, SD = 0.89) than black Africans (M = 2.84, 
SD = 1.15) (t(174) = -3.20, p=0.0016). The black African race group feels that their overall 
personal conditions are significantly worse (M = 2.29, SD = 0.93) than the white race group 
(M = 1.88, SD = 0.90) (t(135) = 2.89, p=0.0045). No significant difference was uncovered 
between black Africans (M = 2.22, SD = 0.86) and whites (M = 2.37, SD = 0.91) for whether 
they thought that their overall personal conditions were better or worse than other members of 
their population group (t(127) = -1.05, p=0.2955). Black Africans reported that they felt the 
overall conditions of their race group to be significantly worse than those of other South 
African race groups (M = 3.40, SD = 1.13). Conversely, whites reported that their groups 
overall conditions were better than those of other race groups (M = 2.00, SD = 0.83) (t(175) = 
8.75, p<.0001). Both race groups felt that the overall conditions in South Africa are better 
than those in other southern African countries (Black African: M = 1.85, SD = 0.97/White: M 
= 1.88, SD = 0.68) (t(174) = -0.20, p=0.8455), although this difference was not found to be a 
significant one. The above results of the two-independent sample t-test are reflected in the 
table below.  
 
 79 
Table 17. The means, standard deviations and p-values for the comparison of each relative 
deprivation item between the black African and white race groups.  
Relative Deprivation scale item Race Mean Standard 
deviation 
p-value 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 1 
At the moment are you satisfied/dissatisfied with your 
personal economic conditions? 
B 
W 
3.52 
3 
1.13 
1.25 
*0.0069 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 2 
Do you expect that your personal economic conditions will 
get better/same/worse one year from now? 
B 
W 
2.18 
2.88 
1.03 
0.90 
*<.0001 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 3 
At the moment are you satisfied/dissatisfied with economic 
conditions in South Africa? 
B 
W 
3.72 
4 
0.97 
0.81 
*0.0406 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 4 
Do you expect that economic conditions in South Africa will 
get better/same/worse one year from now? 
B 
W 
2.84 
3.37 
1.15 
0.89 
*0.0016 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 5 
Would you say that your overall personal conditions are 
better/same/worse than those of other South Africans? 
B 
W 
2.29 
1.88 
0.93 
0.90 
*0.0045 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 6 
Would you say that your overall personal conditions are 
better/same/worse as other members of your population 
group? 
B 
W 
2.22 
2.37 
0.86 
0.91 
0.2955 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 7 
Would you say that the overall conditions of people from 
your population group are better/same/worse than those of 
other groups in South Africa? 
B 
W 
3.40 
2 
1.13 
0.83 
*<.0001 
Relative Deprivation Scale: item 8 
Would you say that the overall conditions in South Africa 
are better/same/worse than those in other southern African 
countries? 
B 
W 
1.85 
1.88 
0.97 
0.68 
0.8455 
 
A multivariate analysis of variance was then performed to discover whether a significant 
difference exists in the levels of relative deprivation for each scale item, for those whose 
essays expressed Liberal, Deterioration, and Catastrophic future ideologies. To reiterate, each 
item of the relative deprivation scale was assessed individually due to the low score of 
internal consistency that this scale yielded. Significant differences were found only to exist 
between the second, fourth, and eighth items. Those who expressed Liberal future ideologies 
were found to perceive lower levels of personal economic relative deprivation for the second 
scale item (M = 2.19, SD = 0.97) while those who expressed Deterioration (M = 2.81, SD = 
1.01) and Catastrophic ideologies (M = 2.75, SD = 0.94) perceived higher levels of relative 
deprivation on this particular item, F(2, 133) = 6.47, p=0.0021). On closer examination 
however, a Tukey‟s Studentized Range test revealed that this significant difference only 
applied in fact to the Liberal and Deterioration ideologies (p=0.008599). Similarly, those who 
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described Liberal ideologies were found to report significantly lower levels of relative 
deprivation for the fourth scale item which measured overall economic conditions in South 
Africa (M = 2.64, SD = 1.06) than those who described Deterioration (M = 3.47, SD = 0.93) 
and Catastrophic (M = 3.83, SD = 0.82) future outlooks, F(2, 133) = 17.34, p<.0001). The 
results of a further Tukey‟s Studentized Range test found that this significant difference 
existed only between the Liberal and Deterioration categories (p=0.000286), and the Liberal 
and Catastrophic categories (p=0.0001). Significantly lower levels of overall national relative 
deprivation were uncovered for those who depicted Liberal ideologies in their essays (M = 
0.42, SD = 0.40), while those who depicted Deterioration (M = 0.71, SD = 0.44) and 
Catastrophic (M = 0.66, SD = 0.38) ideologies once again yielded higher levels of relative 
deprivation for this eighth item, F(2, 133) = 7.53, p=0.000802). This significant difference 
was found only to extend to the Liberal and Deterioration ideologies however (Tukey‟s: 
p=0.003200).  
 
4.14.  Does a significant difference exist between one‟s primary social group identity 
and their levels of optimism to the future and perceived relative deprivation, 
and does optimism to the future, relative deprivation and primary social group 
identification predict one‟s future outlook? 
 
A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to determine whether a significant difference 
exists between the samples primary social group identities and their levels of optimism to the 
future and perceived relative deprivation. This analysis revealed that no significant difference 
does in fact exist between one‟s primary identity and their perceived levels of relative 
deprivation, F(5, 83) = 0.35, p=0.8838, and that no significant difference exists between one‟s 
primary identity and their level of optimism to the future, F(5, 182) = 1.21, p=0.3058.  
 
The relative deprivation means and standard deviations of each of the six primary identity 
categories are depicted in the table below.  
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Table 18. The means of the relative deprivation and optimism scales for each of the six 
primary social group identities.  
Primary Identity 
Categories 
Relative deprivation scale Optimism scale 
N Mean SD N Mean SD 
African  52 2.70 0.54 51 2.92 0.83 
South African 27 2.76 0.40 27 3.04 0.99 
Race 9 2.85 0.46 9 2.56 0.72 
Gender 32 2.71 0.53 32 2.75 0.87 
Religion 55 2.67 0.50 55 3.10 0.92 
Ethno-linguistic 14 2.81 0.75 14 3.15 0.89 
 
Lastly, a generalized logistic regression was run to determine whether optimism to the future, 
perceived relative deprivation and primary social group identification (African, nationality, 
race, gender, religion or ethno-linguistic identity) predicts whether one holds either a Liberal, 
Deterioration, or Catastrophic future ideology. The Newton-Raphson optimization technique 
was used to estimate the regression parameters. The convergence criterion was satisfied 
indicating that the maximum-likehood algorithm had indeed converged. The GCONV relative 
gradient convergence criterion (default precision = 10
-8
) was used to assess the convergence. 
When the global null hypothesis (  = 0) was tested the full model was found to be significant 
(Likelihood Ratio: 
2   
(14, N = 120) = 106.31, p<.0001) indicating that at least one of the 
predictors regression coefficients is not equal to zero in the model. However, when the three 
predictors are considered separately, only relative deprivation, 
2   
(2, N = 120) = 9.47, p = 
0.0088, and optimism to the future, 
2   
(2, N = 120) = 32.10, p<.0001, significantly predict 
one‟s future ideology. Primary social group identification is not a significant predictor of 
one‟s outlook to the future, 2   (10, N = 120) = 5.73, p=0.8374. While the overall relative 
deprivation model was found to be significant, it must be noted that the separate models (as 
indicated in the table below) were not. The results for relative deprivation as a predictor of 
Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies therefore should be considered with 
caution. The negative estimated logistic regression coefficient for relative deprivation (-1.08) 
means that relative deprivation as a predictor decreases the probability of a Liberal outlook, 
but increases the probability of a future ideology of Deterioration (1.10) given that the other 
variables are held constant in the model. Optimism as a predictor increases the probability of 
both Liberal (4.99) and Deterioration (2.59) ideologies given that the other variables are held 
constant.  
 
The complete results for the logistic regression are available in the table below.  
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Table 19. Results of the generalized logistic regression.  
Parameter Future 
Ideology 
DF Coeff-
icient  
Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > 
Chi 
Square 
Point  
Estimate 
95% Wald 
Confidence 
Limits 
Intercept Liberal 1 -8.99 6.95 0.0084    
Intercept Deterioration 1 -8.47 7.90 0.0049    
RD Liberal 1 -1.08 1.41 0.2352 0.340 0.06 2.02 
RD Deterioration 1 1.10 2.67 0.1025 2.995 0.80 11.17 
OPT Liberal 1 4.99 31.08 <.0001 146.285 25.35 844.16 
OPT Deterioration 1 2.59 12.82 0.0003 13.344 3.23 55.12 
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Chapter Five 
Discussion 
 
5.1.  Predominant future ideologies 
 
The most widespread future ideologies that were held by the sample were the Liberal, 
Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies. Nearly a third of the sample was Liberal in their 
outlooks to the future. As per the current study‟s definition, these individuals therefore 
perceived gradual and smooth improvements in the existing social order through peaceful 
transformations whereby conflicts are resolved amicably and conditions of life ultimately 
improve for all South African citizens. Mannheim (1936) made reference to a Liberal 
ideology in his pioneering work on future ideologies. He foresaw this orientation as 
encompassing a „positive acceptance of culture‟ and „ethical values‟. Leatt et al. (1986) 
contend that a Liberal tradition has in fact prevailed in South Africa historically. They 
describe Liberalism as an ideology that is strongly individualistic in nature and that is centred 
round individual freedom. Equality is also at the core of this belief. Liberals believe that every 
individual is equal to another, and therefore that the same basic human rights should be 
granted to everyone and equal opportunities should exist in all spheres of life. This ideology is 
a particularly positive one, as a Liberal individual is viewed in an optimistic light. He/she is 
seen as being naturally good, and capable of and responsible for shaping his/her own destiny. 
In Liberalism, it is by man‟s efforts that society will progress towards “greater social justice, 
economic prosperity and political stability” (p. 4) and that suffering will be minimised. 
Politically in Liberalism, people are seen as being superior to the government and political 
power is seen to exist and be exercised for the good of the public alone. This is based on the 
premise that a government cannot in fact be regarded as legitimate unless it is based on the 
consent of the governed (Degenaar, 1983). While Liberals are generally against progress by 
revolutionary means (Leatt et al., 1986), they do however justify this means when a 
government becomes authoritarian and begins to violate the natural rights of its people 
(Degenaar, 1983). Various critiques of Liberalism do however exist. As was mentioned above 
the individual is at the core of the Liberal ideology and is therefore the basic unit of social 
analysis. In a diverse and multiracial society such as South Africa however, some argue that 
this ideology fails to give the necessary attention to the interests and aspirations of groups in 
such a context and that it therefore fails to take the composite plural character of South 
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African society into account. Furthermore, while Liberals fight for individual freedom they 
eventually become conservative in the sense that they conservatively support the status quo 
when this freedom is eventually achieved. European liberals historically advocated the 
economic system of free enterprise otherwise known as capitalism, as they were convinced 
that private ownership of property guarantees individual freedom and that such a market 
economy will lead to greater prosperity for all. An additional critique is that Liberalism can 
thus be seen as being an excuse for capitalism (Leatt et al., 1986).  
 
Nearly a fifth of the current sample foresaw futures of Deterioration. In accordance with the 
current study‟s constructed definition of this ideology category these individuals envisage that 
the government will be responsible for the deteriorating conditions in South Africa‟s future. 
The Catastrophic ideology, which represents a more extreme form of Deterioration, upholds 
that, in the future, the deteriorating conditions in the country will culminate into „a disastrous 
future characterized by economic decline, crime and disorder‟, as per the current study‟s 
definition. Just more than a tenth of the sample respondents endorsed this future orientation. 
When these two ideologies are combined however, to represent an overarching ideology of 
general future deterioration and decline, nearly a third of the study participants were found to 
hold this fatalistic view. The proportions of respondents who endorsed the Liberal ideology, 
and who thus see progress in the country‟s future, are nearly identical to those who foresee 
impending deterioration and catastrophe.  
The three hypothetical future scenarios that emerged from the discussions that took place in 
the Dinokeng Scenarios undertaking (referred to in Section 2.3.1.4 of the Literature Review) 
were named „Walk Together”‟, „Walk Behind‟ and „Walk Apart‟. These future scenarios were 
found to closely resemble the Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies respectively.  
In the „Walk Together‟ future it is by the efforts of South African citizens (the „Citizens 
Charter‟) that the country is able to progress and prosper - a characteristic which is also at the 
core of the Liberal ideology. Furthermore, the definition of Liberalism in the current study 
understands change to be gradual. This characteristic seems to also be common to the „Walk 
Together‟ future scenario, as progress also occurs gradually. It is only after the first two years 
of this scenario which are known as the „Bleak Years‟ that positive change finally begins to 
occur in the country. The scenario seems to conclude with the ultimate improvement of life 
for all South African individuals.  
 85 
Certain similarities exist between the Deterioration ideology and that of the „Walk Behind‟ 
future scenario. Despite the government‟s best attempts to develop the country, the economic 
crisis serves to exacerbate the already fragile economic conditions. The result is that the South 
African government accumulates a great deal of debt and overall conditions begin to worsen. 
This causes widespread discontent amongst the South African population. These 
circumstances resemble those of the Deterioration future ideology in which conditions in the 
country begin to deteriorate and little can be done to prevent this from happening. It is evident 
in the „Walk Behind‟ future scenario that the global economic crisis is largely responsible for 
the deteriorating conditions in the country, and there is indeed little that can be done to 
counteract such a large-scale crisis such as an economic one. A characteristic of the 
Deterioration ideology however, is that there is fatalistic acceptance of the inevitable 
deteriorating situation, and this does not appear to be common to the „Walk Behind‟ scenario, 
in which the South African people actively express their intense discontent with the country‟s 
state of affairs through protest action.  
 
The „Walk Apart‟ future scenario is clearly more representative of the Catastrophic future 
ideology as it depicts a future of severe and rapid deterioration that eventually culminates in a 
state of emergency. In the Catastrophic future ideology the existing political order is 
responsible for leading the country into a disastrous future that is characterized by economic 
decline, crime and disorder. Things go from bad to worse and South Africans once again 
fatalistically accept this deteriorating situation. In the „Walk Apart‟ scenario it is evident that 
circumstances in the country do indeed go from bad to worse. The global economic crisis 
once again has a hugely decisive role to play in this future, as it serves to exacerbate 
unemployment, which subsequently results in crime becoming more rampant. The education 
and healthcare sectors deteriorate, poverty escalates, skilled minorities leave the country, and 
service delivery fails possibly as a result of the widespread corruption in the South African 
government. Upsurges of civil protests arise, but civilians are threatened with violence by the 
local warlords and militia with whom the government has formed surreptitious alliances. 
Terror and fear spread throughout the country, and complete disorder is unleashed, and when 
a state of emergency is finally declared ultimate catastrophe seems to have been reached.  
 
The Technicist, Revolutionary and Socialist ideologies do not appear to be commonly held 
ideologies in today‟s society as far as the results of the current study demonstrate. While the 
Revolutionary ideology was supported most strongly out of the three, followed by the 
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Technicist outlook and Socialist ideology, only a handful of individuals were interpreted as 
endorsing each of these outlooks. Mannheim (1936) referred to a Socialist-Communist 
ideology in his early work. This ideology represents a newly created order in which 
capitalism is abolished, freedom and equality are brought about, and the focus is concentrated 
on the economic and social structure of society. The nature of communism before the fall of 
the Soviet Union however, is likely to be very different to communism that prevails in the 
modern age. Furthermore, African communism or socialism also departs somewhat from 
communism in the traditionalist sense. Leatt et al. (1986) contend that many consider 
socialism to be the only morally acceptable type of government in South Africa given the 
country‟s past economic and political injustices. At the core of African socialism therefore is 
the desire to abolish the exploitation of man by man, and instead represent the interests of all 
citizens. This political ideology however, is unique in the sense that it is built on the 
traditional values of African collectivism and therefore claims to act on behalf and in the 
interests of the people as one nation. It is possible that the low acceptance of the Socialist 
ideology amongst the current sample is reflective of a desire for the preservation of capitalism 
in South Africa.  
 
The Conservative ideology did not emerge at all in the current study. When one considers the 
findings of the past studies this is not surprising. From 1992 onwards this ideology began to 
slowly disappear. As this outlook depicts a desire for the existing order to return to the 
separatist system of apartheid, it is possible that certain individuals are no longer comfortable 
identifying with this racist and socially unacceptable ideology. A further possibility is that 
South Africans simply reject the oppressive and discriminatory Conservative ideology as it 
harks back to the „old South Africa‟ and stands in stark contrast to the ideals of the „new 
South Africa‟.  
 
A moderate proportion of essays were classified as Unclassifiable in the current study. These 
figures however, do not compare to those found by Finchilescu and Dawes (199b, 2001) in 
their 1996 study. These authors reported that there was a significant drop in the number of 
classifiable essays after their 1992 study. The proportion of essays coded as Unclassifiable 
stood at 16% in 1992 and increased tremendously to 83% of all essays in 1996. The authors 
are of the opinion that this substantial shift was reflective of the change that the political 
transformation brought about in which the formerly divided and oppressed South Africa 
emerged as a liberal democracy. They argue that the “crisis prompted by apartheid, which 
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gave clear shape to the future ideologies of the earlier period, was no longer present” 
(Finchilescu & Dawes, 2001, p.144) and as a result, the future became blurred and difficult to 
define. Only 14.8% of the current study‟s essays failed to present a definable future. It follows 
that the present „crises‟ that currently shape the South African context (i.e. the high incidence 
of crime, corruption in government, increasing unemployment, the Eskom crisis, the threat of 
the HIV/Aids pandemic, etc) make it easier for South Africans to identify with a particular 
future hence the lower proportion of Unclassifiable essays in the current study.  
 
A surprising finding was that a relatively high proportion of the sample failed to discuss the 
future of the country at all. Instead, their essays referred only to the present conditions in 
South Africa. While a number of other essays spoke of the future as was specified by the 
essay question, they also in part discussed the present. This finding seems to reflect a fixed 
preoccupation with the current state of the nation amongst the study participants, and it seems 
as if the respondents used their essays as a way to vent about the current circumstances in the 
country. The fact that most participants who discussed the present in their essays did so in a 
negative manner lends support to this argument. In Adamson et al‟s. (2007) study they found 
that many of their adolescent participants were particularly neutral in their views of the future. 
They put forth that this neutrality could very well have been due to a lack of clarity of what 
will unfold in the future, and they suggest that it is perhaps easier to envision a future in a 
more proximal future period. The current study asked its participants to imagine a possible 
future 51 years ahead of the present time. Certain respondents may have found it difficult to 
look so far forward into the future and this may have accounted for why some participants 
could not envision a particular future at all. A further possibility is that these participants 
simply do not see the future as being markedly different from the present. The findings of 
Grootboom‟s (2007) study however; seem to suggest that many South Africans fail to give the 
future much thought. Nineteen percent of his study‟s participants were indifferent to the 
future or had failed to give it much thought. When asked how often they thought about the 
future of South Africa 55% of his respondents said that they gave serious thought to the 
future, while 30% acknowledged that they gave the future no thought whatsoever. In his study 
of Finnish youth‟s future images of society, Rubin (1998, as cited in Ono, 2005) found that 
his study participants were also exceedingly vague about the future of their country. This 
provides evidence to suggest that it is not only South African adolescents who appear to lack 
clarity about what will happen in the future. All societies have their own conceptions of the 
Past, the Present and the Future, but they differ in terms of how they rank these dimensions of 
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time (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961). Certain societies, for example, place the most 
emphasis on the Present and therefore pay little attention to the Past or the Future, while 
others have a strong respect for tradition and the Past is therefore of great importance. 
Americans conversely have strong leanings to the future which is anticipated to be „bigger 
and better‟. Black African society however, is traditionally acknowledged to be one that is 
most oriented to the Past (Mkhize, 2004). The difficulties in thinking about the future that are 
reflected in the high number of essays that discussed only the present, could possibly have 
been due to this actuality. Racial differences in the number of „present‟ essays shall be 
considered in the following section (5.2) in an attempt to confirm or disconfirm this 
likelihood.   
 
It emerged from the essays of those who discussed the present conditions in the country that 
participants are most preoccupied with 21 particular spheres within present-day South African 
society. General dissatisfaction was expressed with regards to the current education system, 
healthcare system, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the justice system, skills, unemployment levels, 
poverty, current living conditions in the country, the receding economy and the widespread 
problem of crime. Furthermore, the sample was generally negative in their opinions of Black 
Economic Empowerment; and teenage pregnancy and emigration were further sources of 
disgruntlement. There were mixed feelings regarding development and race relations in the 
country. The prevalence of corruption in the South African government and the greed that 
seems to be rife amongst the country‟s leaders were further sources of frustration. A great 
deal was said about Jacob Zuma, the current ANC president. While some participants spoke 
of him with respect and admiration, most others made reference to the recent allegations of 
corruption and rape that were directed at him. Unsurprisingly, South African politics and 
leadership were both topics that were not held in high esteem. In Poole and Cooney‟s (1987) 
study it was mentioned how the findings of other research seem to suggest that adolescents 
tend to be largely disengaged from the political process. Poole and Cooney (1987) however, 
found evidence to contradict this finding, as their adolescent participants‟ perceptions of the 
future cohered largely around politics. The fact that the current study‟s participants‟ also had a 
great deal to say about the current South African political process also seems to stand in 
contradiction to this assumption. The recent political controversies in South Africa are likely 
to have brought about a preoccupation with the political process that may very well account 
for this inconsistency. Due to the poor standing of the government some participants spoke of 
the 2009 elections with a sense of pessimistic anticipation and dread, while others conveyed 
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more optimism and were clearly excited by this important event. The abovementioned 
findings confirm that many of the crises that the country currently faces and that were 
discussed in Section 2.4 of the Literature Review are indeed pertinent matters in today‟s 
society.  
 
5.2.  Future ideologies by race 
 
The black African race group was predominantly Liberal in their outlooks to the future with 
more than half of these participants endorsing this ideology. This seems to have been an 
almost consistent finding from study to study, with the exception of the 1963 study in which it 
was found that black Africans expressed predominantly Revolutionary ideologies, followed 
by Liberal ideologies. This group‟s second most widely held future orientation was the 
Deterioration ideology. They supported a Catastrophic future to a far less extent. These 
findings reflect that while some of the black African group perceive deteriorating future 
conditions in the country, very few of them believe that the country is heading towards 
catastrophe.  
 
The white race group also appears to be predominantly Liberal in their future ideologies, as 
nearly half of these participants endorsed this future orientation. However, white participants‟ 
second most widely held future ideology was the Deterioration outlook and they supported 
this orientation to a greater extent than the black African race group. They were also fairly 
supportive of a Catastrophic future and belief in this future far outweighed that of the black 
African race group. At first glance whites appear to be predominantly Liberal in their 
outlooks to the future. However, when the Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies are 
considered as one overarching ideology of general deterioration and decline, it becomes 
apparent that the figures of white participants who endorsed a Liberal ideology are identical to 
the figures of whites who endorsed an outlook of general deterioration and decline. The fact 
that white South Africans are significantly more Catastrophic than black South Africans 
seems to validate the literatures consistent findings that the white race group is historically 
less optimistic than the black African race group. The differences in the two groups‟ levels of 
optimism about the future shall be discussed in Section 5.4 to follow.  
 
Perceptions of the future did not appear to differ significantly from one race group to the next. 
It is possible that socio-economic status is perhaps a better predictor of future outlooks.  
 90 
 
When comparisons are made between the black African race groups future ideologies over the 
1963 – 2009 study period, it emerges that black Africans have maintained predominantly 
Liberal outlooks to the future. While in 1963 this group‟s modal future ideology was 
Revolutionary with nearly half of black African participants endorsing this orientation, their 
second most widely held belief was that of a Liberal future. In 1981 this order was found to 
have reversed: black Africans were now more Liberal than they were Revolutionary. In 1992 
a Revolutionary future outlook disappeared completely amongst black Africans. They now 
held a predominantly Liberal belief in the future, and their endorsement of Liberalism was 
found to reach its peak during this year when compared to the other studies. Their second 
most common ideology was that of Catastrophe. This pattern was repeated during 1996; 
however, figures of Liberalism plummeted to an all-time low. This was the year in which an 
exceptionally high proportion of essays were unable to be classified due to their failure to 
depict a definable future. It seems as if the dissolution of the „apartheid crisis‟ that was 
previously spoken of and the advent of a democratic society had a curtailing effect on all the 
ideologies that emerged during this period. The findings of the current study reveal that while 
black Africans are predominantly Liberal yet again, quite a high proportion foresee futures of 
Deterioration, while slightly lower numbers perceive impending Catastrophe.  
 
The pattern of the white race group‟s future ideologies over the 1963-2009 period differs 
quite markedly from that of the black African group. In stark contrast, this group seems to 
uphold consistently Catastrophic views of the future. In 1963 it emerged that most whites 
were Catastrophic followed by Conservative, while in 1981 they maintained a predominantly 
Catastrophic outlook to the future; however, a Technicist view replaced Conservatism as their 
second most widely held belief. In 1992 and 1996 this groups ideologies began to alter fairly 
drastically. While this group remained predominantly Catastrophic, strong levels of 
Liberalism began to emerge. Levels of Conservatism were at an all-time high in 1963, but 
began to decline over the years until they disappeared completely in 1996. The current study 
is the first in which white participants endorse a Liberal future as their most common 
ideology. Deterioration has replaced Catastrophe as their second most predominant view of 
the future, rendering Catastrophe as third.  
 
When the samples present perceptions of the country are considered in terms of race it 
becomes apparent that the black African race group is the most preoccupied with the present, 
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as more than half of the study‟s black African participants used their essays to vent about the 
present state of the nation, while white participants did so to a far less extent. The fact that the 
black African culture places more emphasis on the Past than it does the Future may perhaps 
account for the difficulty that black African individuals seem to experience envisaging the 
future. Of the 21 areas of society that were spoken of in the samples essays corruption in 
government, crime, the receding economy, the 2009 elections, governmental leadership, 
South African politics and the ANC president, Jacob Zuma were referred to most often. It was 
previously acknowledged how common concerns are beginning to emerge across racial 
barriers (Dinokeng Scenarios, 2009), and the samples perceptions of South Africa at present 
substantiate this actuality. They share in common a growing intolerance with the tenuous 
circumstances in the country. Black Africans seem to be the most disgruntled with regards to 
each of the 21 thematic areas however. This seems to reflect a mounting dissatisfaction with 
their group‟s position in South Africa.  
 
5.3.  Social group identifications  
 
In line with the literature (Gibson & Gouws, 2000 as cited in Bornman, in press) black 
Africans were found to endorse the African identity to a stronger degree than they did the 
national South African identity, while the opposite was true of white South Africans. 
Surprisingly however, more than a third of whites endorsed the African identity. It was argued 
in the Literature Review section that white South Africans do not seem to consider the 
African identity as applicable to them. The findings of the current study partly support this 
assumption. While the majority of white participants seem to perceive the African identity as 
being synonymous with the black African racial identity, a third of white respondents 
perceive it to represent a more continental African identity and thus as partly applicable to 
them. White South Africans identify most strongly with a national South African identity of 
all the South African race groups, while black Africans identity the least with this identity 
option. These results therefore lend support to those of Gibson and Gouws (2000, as cited in 
Bornman, in press) and Finchilescu and Dawes (1999a) who reported that black Africans tend 
to endorse the African identity while whites identify more with the national South African 
identity. The current study seems to provide support for the fact that black Africans perceive 
the African identity to be synonymous with a black African racial identity, as identical 
proportions of black African participants identified with their racial identity and the African 
identity, suggesting that they perceive these identities to be one and the same.  
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When the importance that the participants placed on their various identities is considered 
significant differences were found only to exist between black Africans and whites in terms of 
race and gender. Black Africans placed far more importance on their racial identity than did 
whites, while whites conversely placed greater importance on gender as an identity category 
than did black Africans. When one considers that as a group black Africans shared the 
experience of being oppressed under the former apartheid administration it can be argued that 
this experience served to unite them together as a racial group. It is possible that this sense of 
unity can account for the importance that they attach to their race as a part of their self 
identity. Whites, in contrast, did not share such an experience and can therefore be considered 
to lack this sense of unity that seems to be present amongst black Africans. It follows that 
they therefore place greater emphasis on more personalised identity categories such as gender.  
 
5.4.  Levels of optimism to the future 
 
When the participants future valences that emerged from their essay content was considered, 
overall the sample was found to be more positive to the future of the country than they were 
negative; however, this difference was not very great. Forty-one percent were positive, while 
39% were conversely negative in their outlooks. When the findings of other studies are taken 
into consideration it becomes apparent that, in general, South African citizens are more 
optimistic towards the future than they are pessimistic. Hamel et al. (2005) report that 70% of 
their study‟s South African participants conveyed optimism about the future, while the 
findings of the 2003 South African Social Attitudes Survey revealed that 59% of South 
Africans were optimistic that the country was indeed moving in the right direction (Daniel et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, while Mϕller (2007) fails to provide exact figures of optimism she 
nonetheless contends that most South Africans are happy and optimistic about the future. 
These abovementioned findings seem to stand in stark contrast to those of other international 
studies in which youths were predominantly negative in their societal perceptions of the 
future. Poole and Cooney (1987) reported that the Australian and Singapore adolescents in 
their study were largely pessimistic towards the future of their society, while a survey that 
Ono (2005) cites found 64% of their Japanese respondents to be negative to the future. Based 
on the results of these international studies South African youths appear to be more optimistic 
in their outlooks to the future. When the optimism scores from the Optimism scale are taken 
into consideration it becomes evident that, in general, the sample anticipates that things will 
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remain much the same in South Africa over the next five years. In their essay participants 
were required to write about the projected history of South Africa as if they were historians 
writing in the year 2060. Their future valences therefore reflect their levels of 
optimism/pessimism to a future that lies 51 years ahead. As the current study was interested in 
perceptions of the future over a longer time span it is perhaps best to consider this measure 
when attempting to tap into the samples levels of future optimism rather than that of the 
Optimism scale which only considers the future five years in advance. However, the 
reliability of the coding process for the essays future valences is perhaps not as dependable 
when compared to the reliability of the Optimism scale. However, the fact that those 
individuals who expressed optimism towards the future in their essays, in the form of positive 
future valences, were significantly more optimistic in their scores on the Optimism scale 
reflects that these two independent measures are indeed strongly related.  
 
As has been consistently found in the literature (Daniel et al., 2006; Hamel et al., 2005), black 
Africans are significantly more optimistic about the future than are whites. However, the 
black African race group is significantly more disadvantaged than the remaining South 
African race groups overall. As a group black Africans however, have overcome a great deal 
in the past and still continue to withstand greater adversities than the other race groups. It is 
probable that being forced to overcome these daily hardships has served to foster a sense of 
resilience and hardiness within black African individuals, which may indeed account for their 
optimistic attitudes. Pessimism may be seen as adding to these hardships and serving to 
exacerbate an already difficult situation. In contrast, white South Africans, relatively 
speaking, have not had to conquer the challenges that black Africans were and are faced with, 
and it can be argued that this group is thus not as resilient as black Africans. They may 
therefore adopt an attitude of defeatism more readily than black African individuals. It is a 
further possibility that black African participants display greater optimism to the future as 
they consider any future to be preferable to the one they lived under apartheid (Daniel et al., 
2006; Finchilescu & Dawes, 1999b). However, this sample was comprised of relatively young 
participants, most of whom would have been very young children during the final years of 
apartheid, and who were therefore not officially a part of the „apartheid generation‟. It is a 
possibility that the samples black African participants, who were not as severely affected by 
apartheid as were elder black African individuals, are nonetheless very aware of their group‟s 
historical disadvantage and plight, and therefore perceive any future to be better to that of 
apartheid. White South Africans, on the other hand, receive a higher quality of education, 
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experience more affluent economic conditions, and have a better standard of living; however, 
they consistently are the most discontented and least optimistic of all the South African race 
groups. Daniel et al. (2006) contend that this dissatisfaction may be due to a subconscious 
resentment that they no longer „run the show‟ as they did under the apartheid government and 
therefore perceive themselves to have lost their former power.  
 
A significant difference was also found to exist between one‟s degree of optimism to the 
future for those individuals whose essays expressed Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic 
ideologies. Those who perceived Liberal futures were found to be more optimistic to the 
future than were those who perceived futures of Deterioration. Furthermore, those who 
foresaw futures of Deterioration were more optimistic to the future than were those who were 
Catastrophic in their outlooks. It was a finding of the current study that all those participants 
who displayed Liberal ideologies expressed positive future valences, and that all those 
participants who displayed Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies expressed negative 
future valences. Therefore, the Liberal future perception seems to ultimately have an 
optimistic outlook at its core, while perceptions of Deterioration and Catastrophe are 
conversely based on negative outlooks to the future.  
 
5.6. Levels of perceived relative deprivation 
 
Overall, the current sample seems to experience a moderate level of relative deprivation; 
however, when comparisons are made between black Africans and whites the former group 
was found to experience significantly greater levels of relative deprivation than the latter 
group. When one considers that in comparison to the other South African race groups black 
Africans were found to most often report „frequent shortages‟ of their basic needs, and that 
nearly a third of black Africans considered themselves to be „poor‟, while self-perceived 
poverty was virtually non-existent amongst Indian/Asians and whites (Hamel et al., 2005; 
Roberts, 2006), this outcome was to be expected.  
 
Support for this finding is provided when the individual items of the relative deprivation are 
considered. It emerged that black Africans are significantly more dissatisfied with their 
personal economic conditions than whites are with their personal economic conditions. This 
finding points to a relatively high experience of egoistical relative deprivation amongst black 
 95 
Africans. Black Africans however, expect their personal economic conditions to improve in 
the future. The fact that black Africans are consistently more optimistic towards the future 
than whites are, as was discussed in the section above, seems to manifest in this finding, as 
the expectation that such personal economic conditions will improve reflects an optimistic 
outlook to the future. In terms of the overall economic conditions in South Africa at present, 
white South Africans are significantly more dissatisfied than are black Africans. Furthermore, 
whites expect these conditions to deteriorate even further. Similarly, these findings seem to 
provide confirmation for the consistent finding that whites are more pessimistic than are black 
Africans. The results depict that whites are aware of and acknowledge their privileged 
position in relation to the other South African race groups, as they rated their overall personal 
conditions as being considerably better than those of other South Africans. Conversely, black 
Africans feel that their overall personal conditions are significantly worse than those of other 
South Africans. The fraternal measure of relative deprivation that tapped into the samples 
perceptions of their groups overall conditions relative to those of other South African race 
groups revealed that black Africans consider the overall conditions of their group to be 
considerably worse than those of other South African race groups. The opposite was found for 
whites. Mphuthing (1998) reports a similar finding. She uncovered that while black Africans 
were more satisfied with their group‟s position than they had been in the past, they felt 
nonetheless that their position was below that of what they rightfully deserved, and they 
perceived other groups‟ positions to be better than their own. This fraternal relative 
deprivation seems to be what is responsible for the regular strikes and protest actions that 
black Africans are becoming frequently involved in (Mϕller, 2007).  
 
It was then found that those who expressed Liberal future ideologies expected their personal 
economic conditions and the overall economic conditions in South Africa to improve in the 
near future. Those who expressed future ideologies of Deterioration and Catastrophe held 
these expectations to a lesser degree. While these two items were essentially measures of 
relative deprivation, they required participants to disclose their expectations of whether they 
felt that their personal economic conditions/overall economic conditions in South Africa 
would get better or worse in the near future. Asked in this way, these measures can also be 
seen as tapping into the participants levels of optimism towards the future. Therefore, an 
individual who experiences lower levels of relative deprivation, in the sense that they expect 
their personal economic conditions/overall South African conditions to improve, seems to 
also be an individual who is more optimistic towards the future. It follows that such an 
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individual is likely to endorse a more optimistic Liberal ideology. Conversely, an individual 
who expects these conditions to worsen and therefore experiences higher levels of relative 
deprivation, seems to be an individual who is less optimistic towards the future and is thus 
more likely to endorse the more negative future ideologies of Deterioration and Catastrophe. 
These assumptions suggest that some sort of relationship exists between relative deprivation 
and optimism towards the future. It was a further finding that those who expressed Liberal 
ideologies perceived significantly lower levels of overall national relative deprivation than did 
those who expressed Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies. This particular measure of 
relative deprivation requires one to make an international comparison between overall 
conditions in South Africa and those of other southern African countries. The 
abovementioned findings seem to suggest that overall conditions (i.e. overall personal 
conditions and overall national conditions), rather than the relative conditions of other groups, 
seem to play a role in determining whether one predicts a Liberal, Deterioration or 
Catastrophic future ideology.  
 
5.7.  Linkages between future ideology, social group identification, optimism about 
the future and relative deprivation  
 
The current study was also interested in discovering whether any connections existed between 
the study‟s four main variables: future ideology, primary social group identification, optimism 
about the future and perceived relative deprivation. A generalised logistic regression was 
therefore conducted in an attempt to ascertain whether one‟s primary social group 
identification, optimism about the future and perceived relative deprivation predict whether 
one endorses a Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future ideology. It emerged from this 
procedure that one‟s primary social group identification did not significantly predict these 
particular outlooks to the future. It was put forward during section 2.5.3 of the Literature 
Review that identity formations are dynamic social structures that change with changes in 
one‟s environment (Bornman, in press). One‟s social group identifications therefore seem to 
be fairly irregular and inconstant parts of one‟s self-concept. It follows that such a fluctuating 
variable would likely have relatively low predictive control over one‟s outlook to the future.  
In contrast however, one‟s levels of optimism about the future and their degree of perceived 
relative deprivation were found to both be significant predictors of the endorsement of 
Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies. When comparisons are made 
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between the predictive powers of these two variables, it is evident that optimism about the 
future is a stronger predictor of Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies than 
is perceived relative deprivation. It is likely that the problems associated with the relative 
deprivation scale in terms of its low internal consistency may have served to reduce this 
variables predictive influence. However, it is also possible that relative deprivation as a 
variable is simply not as strong in predicting Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic future 
ideologies as is optimism about the future. The assumption was made in section 5.4 above 
that a Liberal future ideology seems to encompass an optimistic view about the future and that 
Deterioration and Catastrophic future ideologies conversely seem to encompass pessimistic 
stances to the future. This supposes that Liberalism and an optimistic outlook are in fact 
synonymous, while the same is true for Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies and a 
pessimistic outlook. If this assumption is indeed correct then it follows that optimism about 
the future would indeed be strongly predictive of whether one endorses a Liberal, 
Deterioration or Catastrophic future ideology.  
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
 
 
6.1  Summary of Central Findings  
 
The primary aim of the current research was to identify the future ideologies that are held by 
University of the Witwatersrand students in the current South African context. This study 
essentially comprises the fifth study of a line of research on future ideologies that was 
initiated by Kurt Danziger in South Africa in 1956. While Danziger‟s original study and its 
three successive replications were conducted during and shortly after the acute socio-political 
instability of the apartheid era, the current study was prompted by the recent political 
vicissitudes that have occurred within the South African political arena of late. The 
nationwide controversy that arose from the rift that occurred within the ANC and the 
subsequent formation of a breakaway political party served to threaten the stability of the 
South African political structure. However, while this event did not in fact emerge as a 
destabilising force as was envisaged, this momentous change nonetheless stimulated a great 
deal of careful reflection on the future of the country by South African citizens.  
 
This research found that the most widespread future ideologies that are held by University of 
the Witwatersrand students are the Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic ideologies. 
Technicist, Socialist and Revolutionary orientations to the future are rarely endorsed. These 
perceptions however, were not found to differ significantly in terms of race. A relatively large 
proportion of participants‟ essays failed to present a definable future and were thus unable to 
be categorised. This indecisiveness with regards to imagining a probable future for the 
country may in fact be an indicator of the stability of current day South African society. An 
interesting finding was that a sizeable proportion of the current sample used their essays as a 
way to vent about the current circumstances in the country and seemed to experience 
difficulty envisioning a possible future for South Africa. Black Africans in particular seemed 
to be the most preoccupied with the present. While a number of themes emerged from the 
essay content that dealt with the samples present perceptions, aspects of the South African 
political landscape featured most prominently. Corruption in government was widely spoken 
of, as was governmental leadership, the 2009 elections, South African politics in general, and 
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the current ANC president, Jacob Zuma. When the findings of the previous studies on future 
ideologies that were conducted in South Africa are considered it appears as if black Africans 
remain consistently Liberal in their outlooks to the future. Whites, conversely, appear to be 
predominantly Catastrophic, although figures of those who endorse such a future ideology 
seem to be receding.  
 
Little could be ascertained about the samples social group identifications, as very few 
significant differences were uncovered. What was revealed was that whites identify more 
strongly with the national South African identity than do black Africans. Furthermore, while 
black Africans place more importance on race as an identity construct, gender is more 
important to the identities of whites. Although the black African race group was found to 
experience greater perceived relative deprivation when compared to white South Africans, 
they were also found to experience greater levels of optimism about the future. In particular, 
items of relative deprivation that measured one‟s personal economic conditions and one‟s 
perception of the overall economic conditions of South Africa were found to have a 
significant bearing on whether one foresees a Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future. 
Furthermore, while optimism about the future and perceived relative deprivation were found 
to significantly predict whether one holds Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future 
ideologies, one‟s primary social group identity did not have such predictive power.  
 
6.2  Limitations 
 
The limitations of the current study cohered predominantly around the characteristics and size 
of the sample. While the sample sizes of the black African and white race groups were 
adequate, those of the coloured and Indian/Asian race groups were exceptionally small in 
comparison. As a result of this inadequacy, these latter two race groups were often unable to 
be included in many of the statistical analyses. Accessing a larger sample overall may have 
served to correct this. Furthermore, the demographic characteristics of university students, 
which comprised the participants in the current sample, are not entirely representative of those 
of the South African population. It follows that the findings of the current study are 
unfortunately not able to be generalized to the remainder of the South African population. It 
can also be argued that university students augmented education and exposure to various 
ideologies renders them an even less representative sample. As many of these students are 
likely to reside in and around the city of Johannesburg it is possible that they are exposed to 
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and experience more westernised ideologies. However, two of the past studies which dealt 
with future ideologies in the South African context (Danziger, 1963; Du Preez et al., 1981) 
made use of university students and a similar sample was thus selected for purposes of 
replication. As Wits University is a predominantly English-speaking university there were 
very few white Afrikaans-speaking students in the current sample. Consequently, this group, 
which formed one of the comparison groups in each of the prior South African studies was 
not able to be included in the current study. An additional methodological limitation 
concerned the problem of low internal consistency that was associated with the relative 
deprivation scale. The consequence of this is that all findings with regard to the measure of 
relative deprivation should be regarded with extreme caution. A different version of this scale 
would have been preferable. A wealth of information emerged from the essays that were 
written by the current study‟s participants. However, as the essays were analysed by means of 
a quantitative thematic content analysis rather than a qualitative thematic content analysis the 
qualitative substance of this content went largely unacknowledged. It is believed that 
considering this content would have added even greater value to the current study; however 
this was beyond the scope of this research endeavour.  
 
6.3  Recommendations for Future Research 
 
It is important that Kurt Danziger‟s tradition of research on future ideologies be continued in 
the South African context. Orkin and Jowell (2006) argue that a country‟s attitudinal profile is 
as much a part of its social reality as are its demographic composition, its culture, and its 
social patterns. Furthermore, in a democratic society, such as South Africa, “…knowledge 
about citizen‟s perceptions is crucial not only to inform government officials about what the 
citizenry thinks of their performance and policies, but… it enables researchers and scholars to 
make continuous assessments of citizens‟ attitudes which constitutes one of the structural 
conditions of democratic sustainability” (Pillay, 2006). Regular data of this kind therefore 
allows a country to measure the progress it is making in terms of achieving its intended 
economic, social and political goals (Orkin & Jowell, 2006). Future South African researchers 
who have an interest in future ideologies are therefore called upon to conduct further 
replications of Danziger‟s original study at opportune times during the future. It is 
recommended however, that the limitations of the current study are taken into consideration 
by such future researchers. Future research could also employ different measures, such as 
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focus groups or the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in order to obtain a 
more holistic understanding. 
 
If the findings of the current study are indeed an accurate reflection of the general attitudes of 
South African citizens it seems as if resentment and dissatisfaction towards the current 
circumstances in the country are rife amongst the South African population at present. This 
assumption is based on the finding that a large proportion of the participants in the current 
study used their essays as a way to vent about the current state of the nation. As the samples 
present perceptions of the country were not the focus of the current research this content went 
largely unacknowledged. However, these participants‟ perceptions were of great interest. 
Future researchers may wish to delve more into why it is that certain South African 
adolescents experience difficulty envisaging a possible future for the country and are instead 
so preoccupied with the present.  
 
The participants‟ future ideologies in the current study were not found to differ significantly 
across racial barriers. It was suggested in the Discussion section that South Africans future 
ideologies could instead differ in terms of socio-economic differences. This possibility 
requires exploration.  
 
6.4  Implications and Conclusion 
 
The fact that the black African and white race groups were not found to differ significantly in 
terms of the future ideologies that they endorsed perhaps serves as reason to hope that the rifts 
that have existed between these two groups historically are being gradually repaired, and that 
younger generations of black Africans and whites are becoming more similar in terms of their 
perceptions of the future. However, the samples pervasive negativity concerning the present 
conditions in the country seems to have a curtailing effect on their abilities to envisage a 
possible future for the country. This may pose as a threat to their smooth transition from 
adolescence to adulthood. On the contrary however, it can also be argued that the current 
conditions in the country, when compared to conditions in the past, are considerably more 
stable and that it is this stability that makes it difficult for certain individuals to envisage a 
future for the country. The paucity of research into the societal future ideologies of South 
African citizens highlights the need for studies of this nature to be conducted.  
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Appendix D 
 
Demographic Questionnaire 
Please cross (X) the appropriate boxes.  
 
 
 1.  Age: ____________ 
 
2.  Gender:            
Female                                    Male   
 
3.  Race:     
Black             Coloured               
 
Indian/Asian                  White     
 
 
4. Home language: 
Afrikaans        English    
isiNdebele       isiXhosa    
isiZulu       Sepedi    
Sesotho        Setswana    
siSwati         Tshivenda    
Xitsonga         
Other        Please specify:  ____________________________ 
         
5. Year of study:  _______________ 
 
 
These questions are asked to ensure that a representative sample is 
obtained for this study. 
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Appendix E: Essay 
 
Please write a short essay of no more than 3 pages on the history of South Africa 
projected into the future. Imagine you are a historian writing in 2060. Outline what you 
think the history of South Africa will be during the period: 2009 (starting today) to 2060. 
Do not simply describe what South Africa might be like in 2060, but give an account of 
things that are likely to happen in this 50 year period.  
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
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Appendix F: Social Group Identification Checklist 
 
Each of us has a number of identities. They are part of how we describe ourselves. For 
example, we are males or females and we can also have an identity as a member of a sports 
team or a religious group. The list below contains some identities. Mark as many of them as 
apply to you with a cross (X).  
 
 
 
African    Zulu     Sesotho  
Sotho     Female    White   
South African    isiXhosa    Sepedi   
isiNdebele    Muslim    Male   
Afrikaans-speaking   Xitsonga    Christian  
siSwati    Coloured    Swati   
Tshivenda    English-speaking   Black   
Indian/Asian    Setswana    isiZulu   
Ndebele    Buddhist    Tsonga  
Hindu     Tswana    Jewish   
Venda     Xhosa    
 
Other (please specify): _______________________________________________________ 
 
 
Below, list your identities in order of importance. You do not have to use all 5 slots. For 
example, suppose you see yourself as being English and South African. If being South 
African is more important to you than being English, then you would write South African in 
slot “1” and English in slot “2”.  
 
 
RANK IDENTITY 
Most Important                1  
                                            
2 
 
3  
                                           
4 
 
Least important               5  
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Appendix G: Optimism Scale 
 
Below are some aspects of life in South Africa. Please indicate whether you think, in the next 
five years, these things will improve, stay the same, or get worse. Please cross (X) the 
appropriate box.  
 
 
(1) Education  
 
    Get worse    Stay the same               Improve 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(2) Crime 
 
    Get worse    Stay the same               Improve 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(3) Health care 
 
    Get worse    Stay the same               Improve 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(4) Race relations 
 
    Get worse    Stay the same               Improve 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(5) Quality of life 
 
    Get worse    Stay the same               Improve 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
(6) The economy 
 
    Get worse    Stay the same               Improve 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
(7) Do you think the financial situation of future generations will be better, worse, or about 
the same as your own financial situation is today? 
 
 
    Get worse    Stay the same               Improve 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix H: Relative Deprivation Scale 
 
1. At the moment are you (satisfied/dissatisfied) with your personal economic conditions?
       
Very satisfied                       Very dissatisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. Do you expect that your personal economic conditions will get (better/same/worse) one 
year from now?  
           
Much better        Same           Much worse 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
3. At the moment are you (satisfied/dissatisfied) with economic conditions in South Africa? 
      
Very satisfied                        Very dissatisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. Do you expect that economic conditions in South Africa will get (better/same/worse) one 
year from now?    
 
Much better                   Same                    Much worse 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. Would you say that your overall personal conditions are (better/same/worse) than those of 
other South Africans?   
 
Much better                         Much worse 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
6. Would you say that your overall personal conditions are (better/same/worse) as other 
members of your population group?  
         
Much better        Same                    Much worse 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
7. Would you say that the overall conditions of people from your population group are 
(better/same/worse) than those of other groups in South Africa?  
 
Much better        Same                    Much worse 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
8. Would you say that the overall conditions of South Africa are (better/same/worse) than 
those in other Southern African countries?  
 
Much better        Same                     Much worse 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix I  
 
Table 4. Frequencies and percentages of the samples predominant future ideologies.  
Future Ideology Frequency Percent (%) 
No future ideology 34 15.25 
Liberal 71 31.84 
Deterioration 44 19.73 
Catastrophic 26 11.66 
Technicist 5 2.24 
Revolutionary 7 3.14 
Socialist 3 1.35 
Unclassifiable 33 14.80 
 
 
Appendix J 
 
Table 5. Frequencies and percentages of the samples future valences.  
Future 
Valence 
Frequency Percent (%)  
No future valence 34 15.25 
Positive 92 41.26 
Negative 87 39.01 
Neutral 3 1.35 
Mixed 7 3.14 
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Appendix K 
 
Table 6. Frequencies and percentages of the future valences by each future ideology.  
Future Ideology Positive Negative Neutral Mixed No 
future 
valence 
Total  
Liberal 
A 
B 
71 
100.00% 
77.17% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
71 
Deterioration 
A 
B 
 
- 
44 
100.00% 
50.57% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
44 
Catastrophic 
A 
B 
 
- 
26 
100.00% 
29.89% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
26 
Technicist 
A 
B 
5 
100.00% 
5.43% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
5 
Revolutionary 
A 
B 
3 
42.86% 
3.26% 
4 
57.14% 
4.60% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
7 
Socialist 
A 
B 
1 
33.33% 
1.09% 
2 
66.67% 
2.30% 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
3 
Unclassifiable 
A 
B 
12 
36.36% 
13.04% 
11 
33.33% 
12.64% 
3 
9.09% 
100.00% 
7 
21.21% 
100.00% 
 
- 
 
33 
No Future 
Ideology 
A 
B 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
34 
100.00% 
100.00% 
 
34 
 
Total  
 
92 
 
87 
 
3 
 
 
7 
 
34 
 
223 
 
A = percentage of respondents who were positive/negative/neutral of those whose essays 
expressed Liberal/Deterioration/Catastrophic future ideologies 
 
B = percentage of respondents whose essays expressed Liberal/Deterioration/Catastrophic 
future ideologies of those who were positive/negative/neutral to the future 
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Appendix L 
 
Table 7. Frequencies and percentages of the samples present valences.  
Present 
Valence 
Frequency Percent (%)  
No present valence 101 45.29 
Positive 21 9.42 
Negative 82 36.77 
Neutral 10 4.48 
Mixed 9 4.04 
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Appendix M 
 
Table 8. Frequencies and percentages of the samples positive, negative, and neutral 
perceptions of the present categories.   
Present  
Category 
Frequency 
Positive Negative Neutral Total 
Black Economic 
Empowerment 
N = 2 
 
N = 10 - N = 12 
9.84% 
Corruption - N = 40 - N = 40 
32.79% 
Crime - N = 25 - N = 25 
20.49% 
Development N = 5 N = 5 - N = 10 
8.20% 
Economy N = 6 N = 37 - N = 43 
35.25% 
Education N = 3 N = 17 - N = 20 
16.39% 
Elections N = 9 N = 14 N = 4 N = 27 
22.13% 
Emigration - N = 3 - N = 3 
2.46% 
Greed - N = 11 - N = 11 
9.02% 
Healthcare N = 1 N = 7 - N = 8 
6.56% 
HIV/AIDS N = 2 N = 8 - N = 10 
8.20% 
Justice System - N = 3 - N = 3 
2.46% 
Leadership N = 1 N = 37 N = 2 N = 40 
32.79% 
Living Conditions N = 1 N = 9 - N = 10 
8.20% 
Politics N = 6 N = 31 N = 2 N = 39 
23.77% 
Poverty - N = 17 - N = 17 
13.93% 
Race Relations N = 8 N = 11 - N = 19 
15.57% 
Skills N = 1 N = 5 - N = 6 
4.92% 
Teenage Pregnancy - N = 4 - N = 4 
3.28% 
Unemployment N = 1 N = 9 - N = 10 
8.20% 
Jacob Zuma N = 5 N = 31 - N = 36 
29.51% 
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Appendix N 
 
Table 9. Frequencies and percentages of the future ideologies per race group. 
Future 
Ideology  
Black 
African 
Coloured Indian/Asian White Total 
Liberal 
A 
B  
38 
53.52% 
52.78% 
4 
5.63% 
30.77% 
6 
8.45% 
31.58% 
23 
32.39% 
44.23% 
 
71 
Deterioration 
A 
B 
19 
43.18% 
26.39% 
8 
18.18% 
61.54% 
5 
11.36% 
26.32% 
12 
27.27% 
23.08% 
 
44 
Catastrophic 
A 
B 
8 
30.77% 
11.11% 
1 
3.85% 
7.69% 
6 
23.08% 
31.58% 
11 
42.31% 
21.15% 
 
26 
Technicist 
A 
B 
2 
40.00% 
2.78% 
 
- 
2 
40.00% 
10.53% 
1 
20.00% 
1.92% 
 
5 
Revolutionary 
A 
B 
3 
42.86% 
4.17% 
 
- 
 
- 
4 
57.14% 
7.69% 
 
7 
Socialist 
A 
B 
2 
66.67% 
2.78% 
 
- 
 
- 
1 
33.33% 
1.92% 
 
3 
 
Total  
 
 
72 
 
13 
 
19 
 
52 
 
156 
 
A = percentage of respondents whose essays fell in this category 
B = percentage of the race group whose essays fell in this category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
\ 
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Appendix O 
 
Table 10. Frequencies and percentages of the samples future valences by race group. 
 
Future 
valence 
Black 
African  
Coloured Indian/Asian White Total 
Positive 
A 
B 
51 
55.43% 
45.16.3% 
4 
4.35% 
23.53% 
9 
9.78% 
33.33% 
28 
30.43% 
42.42% 
 
92 
Negative 
A 
B 
36 
41.38% 
31.86% 
10 
11.49% 
58.82% 
12 
13.79% 
44.44% 
29 
33.33% 
43.94% 
 
87 
Neutral 
A 
B 
1 
33.33% 
0.88% 
 
- 
1 
33.33% 
3.70% 
1 
33.33% 
1.52% 
 
3 
Mixed 
A 
B 
1 
14.29% 
0.88% 
 
- 
2 
28.57% 
7.41% 
4 
57.14% 
6.06% 
 
7 
 
A = percentage of respondents whose essays fell in this category 
B = percentage of the race group whose essays fell in this category 
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Appendix P 
 
Table 12. Frequencies and percentages of the samples positive, negative and neutral overall 
present valences  
 
Present 
Valence 
Black 
African 
Coloured Indian/Asian White Total 
Positive 
A 
B 
15 
71.43% 
13.27% 
1 
4.76% 
5.88% 
2 
9.52% 
7.41% 
3 
14.29% 
4.55% 
 
21 
Negative 
A 
B 
41 
50.00% 
36.28% 
12 
14.63% 
70.59% 
12 
14.63% 
44.44% 
17 
20.73% 
25.76% 
 
82 
Neutral 
A 
B 
5 
50.00% 
4.42% 
 
- 
2 
20.00% 
7.41% 
3 
30.00% 
4.55% 
 
10 
Mixed 
A 
B 
5 
55.56% 
4.42% 
 
- 
1 
11.11% 
3.70% 
3 
33.33% 
4.55% 
 
9 
No present 
valence 
A 
B 
47 
 
46.53% 
41.59% 
4 
 
3.96% 
23.53% 
10 
 
9.90% 
37.04% 
40 
 
39.60% 
60.61% 
 
101 
 
Total 
 
113 
 
 
17 
 
27 
 
66 
 
223 
 
A = percentage of respondents whose essays fell in this category 
B = percentage of the race group whose essays fell in this category 
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Table 13. Comparison of the percentages of the future ideologies appearing in 1963, 1981,  
1992, 1996 and 2009  
 
Future  
Ideology 
Year Black  
African 
 
White 
 
 
Liberal 
 
1963 22.6 19.1 
1981 34.0 15.0 
1992 87.5 30.8 
1996 6.4 6.4 
2009 52.8 44.2 
 
 
Deterioration 
 
1963 - - 
1981 - - 
1992 - - 
1996 - - 
2009 26.4 23.1 
 
 
Catastrophic 
 
1963 4.8 31.8 
1981 7 40.0 
1992 7.1 44.1 
1996 1.9 18.7 
2009 11.1 21.2 
 
 
Technicist 
 
1963 1.2 13.1 
1981 16 4.0 
1992 - 0.7 
1996 - 1.2 
2009 2.8 1.9 
 
 
Revolutionary 
 
1963 46.4 2.0 
1981 25 20 
1992 - 1.4 
1996 - - 
2009 4.2 7.7 
 
 
Conservative 
 
1963 13.1 20.2 
1981 6.1 13 
1992 - 3.5 
1996 - - 
2009 - - 
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Table 14. Frequencies and percentages of the samples social group identities.    
Identity 
categories 
Identity Black African  Coloured Indian/Asian White 
Continental African N = 94  
83.19% 
N = 6  
35.29% 
N = 3  
11.11% 
N = 24  
36.36% 
Nationality South 
African 
N = 92  
81.42% 
N = 15  
88.24% 
N = 23 
85.19% 
N = 63  
95.45% 
 
Race 
Black N = 94  
83.19% 
- - - 
Coloured N = 1  
0.88% 
N = 15  
88.24% 
N = 1  
3.70% 
N = 1  
1.52% 
Indian/ 
Asian 
- N = 2  
11.76% 
N = 25 
92.59% 
- 
White N = 1  
0.88% 
N = 2  
11.76% 
- N = 62 
93.94% 
 
Gender 
Female N = 85  
75.22% 
N = 13  
76.47% 
N = 19 
70.37% 
N = 44 
66.67% 
Male N = 23  
20.35% 
N = 3  
17.65% 
N = 7  
25.93% 
N = 22 
33.33% 
 
 
 
 
Religion 
Buddhist N = 1  
0.88% 
N = 1  
5.88% 
N = 1  
3.70% 
N = 3  
4.55% 
Christian N = 86  
76.11% 
N = 11  
64.71% 
N = 5  
18.52% 
N = 32 
48.48% 
Hindu - N = 1  
5.88% 
N = 13 
48.15% 
- 
Jewish - N = 1  
5.88% 
- N = 9 
13.64% 
Muslim - N = 3  
17.65% 
N = 8  
29.63% 
N = 2  
3.03% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Language  
Afrikaans-
speaking 
N = 8  
7.08% 
N = 10  
58.82% 
- N = 12 
18.18% 
English-
speaking 
N = 56  
49.56% 
N = 15  
88.24% 
N = 22 
81.48% 
N = 56 
84.85% 
isiNdebele N = 4  
3.54% 
- - - 
isiXhosa N = 9 
7.96% 
- - N = 1  
1.52% 
isiZulu N = 23  
20.35% 
- - N = 4  
6.06% 
Sepedi N = 15  
13.27% 
- - - 
Sesotho N = 19  
16.81% 
- - - 
Setswana N = 18  
15.93% 
 
- - - 
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siSwati N = 10  
8.85% 
- - - 
Tshivenda N = 2  
1.77% 
- - - 
Xitsonga N = 3  
2.65% 
- - - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethnic 
group 
Ndebele N = 4  
3.54% 
- - - 
Sepedi N = 15  
13.27% 
- - - 
Sotho N = 22  
19.47% 
- - - 
Swati N = 13  
11.50% 
- - - 
Tsonga N = 5  
4.42% 
- - - 
Tswana N = 17  
15.04% 
- - - 
Venda N = 3  
2.65% 
- - - 
Xhosa N = 4  
3.54% 
- - - 
Zulu N = 41  
36.28% 
- - - 
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Table 15. Frequencies and percentages of the samples primary social group identifications.  
Primary 
Identity 
Categories 
Black African Coloured Indian/Asian White Total 
African 
A 
B 
24 
85.71% 
23.08% 
3 
10.71% 
18.75% 
 
- 
1 
3.57% 
1.56% 
 
28 
South African 
A 
B 
24 
45.28% 
23.08% 
5 
9.43% 
31.25% 
5 
9.43% 
20.00% 
19 
35.85% 
29.69% 
 
53 
 
Race 
A 
B 
25  
75.76% 
24.04% 
3 
9.09% 
18.25% 
2 
6.06% 
8.00% 
3 
9.09% 
4.69% 
 
33 
Gender 
A 
B 
11 
31.43% 
10.58% 
1 
2.86% 
6.25% 
4 
11.43% 
16.00% 
19 
54.29% 
29.69% 
 
35 
Religion 
A 
B 
29 
50.00% 
27.88% 
4 
6.90% 
25.00% 
12 
20.69% 
48.00% 
13 
22.41% 
20.31% 
 
58 
Ethno-linguistic 
A 
B 
8 
53.33% 
7.69% 
 
- 
2 
13.33% 
8.00% 
5 
33.33% 
7.81% 
 
15 
 
Total 
 
 
104 
 
16 
 
25 
 
64 
 
209 
 
A = percentage of respondents who identified primarily with this identity category 
B = percentage of the race group who identified primarily with this identity category 
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Table 16. Primary Social Group Identifications by the Liberal, Deterioration and Catastrophic 
Future Ideologies.  
 
Primary Identity 
Categories 
Liberal Deterioration Catastrophic Total 
African 
A 
B 
7 
43.75% 
11.48% 
5 
31.25% 
14.71% 
4 
25.00% 
16.00% 
 
16 
South African 
A 
B 
19 
59.38% 
31.15% 
7 
21.88% 
20.59% 
6 
18.75% 
24.00% 
 
32 
Race 
A 
B 
2 
40.00% 
3.28% 
2 
40.00% 
5.88% 
1 
20.00% 
4.00% 
 
5 
Gender 
A 
B 
9 
39.13% 
14.75% 
8 
34.78% 
23.53% 
6 
26.09% 
24.00% 
 
23 
Religion 
A 
B 
18 
52.94% 
29.51% 
10 
29.41% 
29.41% 
6 
17.65% 
24.00% 
 
34 
Ethno-linguistic 
A 
B 
6 
60.00% 
9.84% 
2 
20.00% 
5.88% 
2 
20.00% 
8.00% 
 
10 
 
Total 
 
61 
 
 
34 
 
25 
 
120 
 
 
A = percentage of respondents who identified primarily with this identity category of those 
whose essays expressed either Liberal, Deterioration or Catastrophic future ideologies  
 
B = percentage of respondents whose essays expressed either Liberal, Deterioration or 
Catastrophic future ideologies of those who identified primarily with this identity category 
 
 
